Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6a64d88192415307…

MALICIOUS

PDF

43.0 KB Created: 2020-10-28 10:57:04 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-14
MD5: 7b71560558b8ba47598c1043ce535d62 SHA-1: 9e6ff20731f1c4417e8a2a8c0b559b8373985be0 SHA-256: 6a64d881924153073e926d95d079b2d082dcb53b3d29907a5e9fa882fd76c3a3
194 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains numerous embedded links, with one specifically pointing to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The document body and heuristics indicate a lure to impersonate a cloud document service, instructing the user to enable content, which is a common tactic for malware droppers. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the presence of embedded URLs and the ML classifier's high confidence suggest malicious intent, likely to redirect the user to a malicious site.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Cloud document impersonation lure medium SE_CLOUD_DOC_LURE
    Document impersonates a cloud file-sharing service such as SharePoint, OneDrive, Google Drive, Dropbox, Box, or Microsoft 365 and asks the user to open, verify, or access a shared document
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/123?keyword=everything+everything+google+drive In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4379718/normal_5f8d0b59d98ff.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4404515/normal_5f933622ad363.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4372076/normal_5f8f552d46f82.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4374980/normal_5f977c2b81931.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4367311/normal_5f8e5627d3756.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4387924/normal_5f8eeef12c609.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4370780/normal_5f903af3b4656.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4367268/normal_5f8756129e056.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/2284/4067/files/vuvanibijozagobimamefako.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0266/8127/8660/files/revista_tu_gratis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/4571/4077/files/listening_upper_intermediate.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0484/3916/5082/files/sofusuxawapene.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0486/4475/1528/files/pawolevuwubusa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ff468a25-24b2-44ff-a456-f98045a49f4f/comptia_security_study_guide_reviews.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/e5b51f89-7775-4cc4-9329-cde15a5a2e6b/71607542668.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0496/4263/5417/files/allen_bradley_plc_programming_instructions.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0485/7800/3109/files/shared_preference_in_android_github.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jamokaroxoj/busogeridibowomavali.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/susopuzupure/98836533922.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006b0d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6B0D 4816 bytes
SHA-256: af0a365e4f6c9f08e71be36df4c79cef0cdacdf3361efa3422f34548ec6d8659
font_01_sfnt_off00007b73.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7B73 10196 bytes
SHA-256: b144964513bb556e755c2fee14d796ea15edaa9c436a1c5ea240fb9c41afa493

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