RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 6a5a7648239c56bb

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

24.6 KB First seen: 2022-04-14

MD5: 2f38a01f443e2dd052f2fa2e62590502 SHA-1: 590df8282325658f76b95da9f18b080a01c8e687 SHA-256: 6a5a7648239c56bb6d0f6eee65b1db657815583af116dda55b01962b6c467e15

260 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains critical heuristics indicating the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 via the Equation Editor OLE object. This vulnerability is known to be used for arbitrary code execution, likely to download and run a secondary payload. The presence of OLE object data and automatic linking further supports this attack vector.

Heuristics 6

Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 likely critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE

RTF decodes to an activated Microsoft Equation 3.0 OLE storage whose payload is a high-entropy Ole10Native stream rather than normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is a weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape consistent with CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802.
Ole10Native stream in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM

RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an Ole10Native stream. This is a strong payload-container signal and is related to Word/OLE exploit delivery, but it is not specific enough on its own to assign a CVE.
Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001da2.bin` `a7889b7bf2d0d255b91055e60818fa139dbc00c03e3b9a244b5cac00c1d852fd`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1DA2	4187 bytes

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