Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6a59c360deaa1623…

MALICIOUS

PDF

14.3 KB
MD5: d4c2aa9094a43bd281f97bc7b2ff32c8 SHA-1: d26fef616b1c4c6dd59917b5e059e57f78b0f5d9 SHA-256: 6a59c360deaa16239a7851afd45e4c0e35ce223ddf739cbcb16006322f01e805
116 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The critical ClamAV detection of 'Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36962' and the high ML classifier score strongly indicate malicious exploitation within the PDF. The presence of XFA forms and AcroForm buttons with action triggers are common vectors for PDF exploits. While no specific URLs or scripts were directly indicative of a payload, the overall profile suggests the PDF is designed to exploit a vulnerability for initial execution, likely leading to a secondary download.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36962 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36962
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON
    PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-locale-set/2.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/1.0/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.2/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0041.bin
c06dcd026a7ea0536b63e07ce688691b585339a3ab7ff59065e546b56308c7bb
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 41 at offset 0x2BC4 85 bytes
embedded_file_obj0042.bin
dda0835df994b8be920f715db36452f6cee7bb42bbc9c897f878a7b298ba8e91
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 42 at offset 0x2C76 1029 bytes
embedded_file_obj0043.bin
faa63921e590ea6bc90ca48253be80b8e3600b93abfeb0f6b1a36c7ef4849973
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 43 at offset 0x2E8F 1796 bytes
embedded_file_obj0044.bin
3dd68f00f4fcb366a2a3a17c65cb2626eeddf5ea5713302d374310561d810169
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 44 at offset 0x32DA 144 bytes
embedded_file_obj0045.bin
10c03f88a5f0a0833dc5b2c8ac295b3a3c6f65e23889eb8cc1dc6fe29bf7f275
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 45 at offset 0x3386 77 bytes