Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6a522292bb401bce…

MALICIOUS

PDF

99.7 KB
MD5: 15c08263f46e7900f26e6da9a25e0f8c SHA-1: 14d02c5a7bc1bcabb5983467a3d12b0adbda3b1a SHA-256: 6a522292bb401bce3d1521a1ad382f6a5cb16ebd8f95dbc4b45b0abde9f5aa11
116 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a PDF file identified as malicious by an ML classifier and heuristics. It exploits CVE-2010-0188, a known vulnerability in Adobe Reader related to XFA forms. This exploit likely allows for the execution of arbitrary code, which is often used to download and run additional malicious payloads. No specific family could be identified, but the exploit vector is clear.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream low PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
d41e9d2cc9cff31c3c831c043a22774f6c05753ccd3acb721bf3b6d6dc1b34e2
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 101320 bytes