Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6a51732daf86c9a3…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

773.0 KB Created: 2021-05-16 01:19:41 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: 5285459c3551517055aae0d9ec2e1414 SHA-1: e95a5d0786c6b89c2f9487320a954ea28f396954 SHA-256: 6a51732daf86c9a3e2f0f24e25270d43877df19734e60999f40f401e99aac5bb
772 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The file contains obfuscated VBA macros that leverage WScript.Shell and URLDownloadToFile to download and execute a second-stage payload. The Workbook_Open event is triggered upon opening, initiating the malicious macro execution. The presence of URLDownloadToFile and WScript.Shell calls strongly suggests the intent to download and run external code, likely leading to further infection.

Heuristics 19

  • Reference to URLDownloadToFile API critical SC_STR_URLDOWNLOAD
    Reference to URLDownloadToFile API
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • URLDownloadToFile in VBA critical OLE_VBA_DOWNLOAD
    URLDownloadToFile in VBA
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • VBA ActiveX event launches decoded Excel4 macro critical OLE_VBA_ACTIVEX_XLM_STAGER
    The compiled VBA p-code (identifier table) references an auto-firing ActiveX/control event together with ExecuteExcel4Macro, while the decompressed source does not — the VBA-stomping shape of the ActiveX-event XLM stager. The control event bridges into XLM formula execution to call Win32 / drop payloads, hidden from source-level scanners.
  • ClamAV: Xls.Malware.Powmet-6922919-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Xls.Malware.Powmet-6922919-0
  • Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS
    Reference to CreateProcess API
  • Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPT
    Reference to Windows Script Host
  • Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA instantiates a COM class by raw CLSID high OLE_VBA_GETOBJECT_CLSID_EVASION
    VBA uses GetObject("new:{CLSID}") to instantiate a COM class by raw CLSID rather than a CreateObject ProgID — an uncommon bypass of name-based macro detection.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ExcelVBA.ru/
    • https://ExcelVBA.ru/
    • https://tamali.net/barcode/2d/qr/img/?level=M&razmer=
    • https://tamali.net/barcode/2d/datamatrix/img/?type_s=dmtx&type_s=dmtx&vid=0&text={text
    • https://grandzebu.net/informatique/codbar-en/code128.htm
    • https://excelvba.ru/programmes/Labels/manuals/settings/OutputTabA@t
    • https://excelvba.ru/programmes/Labels/manuals/settings/LabelSetupTabA@t
    • https://excelvba.ru/programmes/Labels/manuals/settings/SourceTableTab
    • https://excelvba.ru/programmes/Labels/manuals/settings/ExtraTab
    • https://excelvba.ru/programmes/Labels/manuals/barcode
    • http://ExcelVBA.ru/php2/updates.php
    • http://Excel-Automation.com/
    • http://www.wordarticles.com/Shorts/RibbonVBA/RibbonVBADemo.php
    • http://ExcelVBA.ru/resources/Labels/
    • http://ExcelVBA.ru/resources/Labels/A@�
    • http://excelvba.ru/programmes/Labels
    • https://excelvba.ru/programmes/Labels/manuals/settings/OutputTab
    • https://excelvba.ru/programmes/Labels/manuals/settings/LabelSetupTab
    • http://barcode.tec-it.com/barcode.ashx?code=QRCode&unit=Fit&imagetype=Png&download=true&dmsize=Default&download=true&data={text
    • https://barcode.tec-it.com/barcode.ashx?code=DataMatrix&unit=Fit&dpi=96&imagetype=Png&dmsize=Default&download=true&data={text
    • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Percent-encoding
    • http://translate.google.com/translate?sl=ru&tl=

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
66f5622d0f90f2589233a7c26c189091fc04798a5a0ae5511405e0dc3b452b2c		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 614091 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 8 long base64-like blob(s).

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