Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6a5116dae3e38738…

MALICIOUS

RTF

33.2 KB First seen: 2022-12-05
MD5: b37b91e94861e4515bf3d78328f73ba5 SHA-1: 688fb6633a4c08529231e69d5e7ec331f5bbbddd SHA-256: 6a5116dae3e3873885e1a98b06af60d65ff2da2e7971eedcff92ab965b7f74a0
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The document also contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', a common tactic to bypass macro security. The embedded OLE object likely contains the exploit code for the Equation Editor vulnerability, which would then execute a malicious payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00005c45.bin
49f65f6a252a62d7203be38d54ece5ab0ef7be26f0970b8eb1c2141a061c85eb
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x5C45 1887 bytes