Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6a435e2aab6dce39…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

53.1 KB Created: 2022-04-22 06:49:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2022-08-25
MD5: 4de19e2c39b1d193e171dc8d804005a4 SHA-1: c0ee5199cc15ed05fc6edf62a193deb819572cee SHA-256: 6a435e2aab6dce39d626eacb39fc964967e35e94abf513da0f6511ab7b1f826e
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample contains an obfuscated AutoOpen VBA macro that uses GetObject to download and execute a payload. The script reconstructs the URL "http://upgredde.scienceontheweb.net/file/upload/list.php?query=1" for this purpose. The macro also attempts to delete a shape and present the document, likely to hide its malicious activity.

Heuristics 6

  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
f25026647a688222a25b701300b48b92ae856fcce1988b5be642fe51ede8a0ba		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1889 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
67df89228ab62a78dc6be27f0b8ba26e7801759976bfcd24b69a6e82645f5906		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 20992 bytes

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