PDF malware analysis — malicious · 6a3f095706031245

MALICIOUS

PDF

192.5 KB Created: 2011-10-24 11:43:49 +02:00 Authoring application: XContent (Pty) Ltd. (via iTextSharp 4.1.2 (based on iText 2.1.2u))

MD5: eacde9dc0f8a595a693cf1c10d98dfee SHA-1: de717a88fdc01d042890e707b8abd2b64385be89 SHA-256: 6a3f0957060312458a631a544877bf8c26738cf13d11282a13c5b378c9d82142

216 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains multiple JavaScript streams, including one that appears to be a modified version of json2.js, and another that attempts to submit data to 'migael@demo.local'. The presence of PDF_EVAL and PDF_JS_PROTOTYPE_POLLUTION heuristics indicates the JavaScript is likely obfuscated and designed to execute malicious code. The script's ability to submit data suggests an attempt to exfiltrate information or deliver a second-stage payload.

Machine Learning

Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.7247

Heuristics 11

Prototype-pollution JavaScript pattern high CVE related PDF_JS_PROTOTYPE_POLLUTION

PDF JavaScript mutates object prototypes while also referencing privileged or sensitive PDF APIs. This tracks a modern PDF exploit technique family without assigning an unverified CVE.
PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER

PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
eval() call high PDF_EVAL

eval() found — commonly used for obfuscated exploit execution (matched inside decoded stream)
JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT

PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS

PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Additional-actions dictionary low PDF_AA

PDF defines /AA (Additional Actions) that references an executable action (JS/JavaScript/Launch/SubmitForm) — can auto-trigger on document or widget events. Form-field calc/format/validate/keystroke handlers in legitimate interactive forms commonly fire this, so it is reported as a low-weight signal; weaponised auto-execution is flagged by stronger rules (PDF_OPENACTION, encrypted-with-JS, etc.)
String.fromCharCode low PDF_FROMCHARCODE

String.fromCharCode found — used to construct payload strings dynamically. Common in benign JavaScript libraries for codepoint manipulation, so this alone is informational; weaponised use is also caught by the dedicated fromCharCode-stage and exploit-shape rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON

PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
External URI info PDF_URI

PDF contains an external URL action
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL http://www.xcontent.com/
- http://erik.eae.net/simplehtmlparser/simplehtmlparser.js
- http://get.adobe.com/reader/
- http://get.adobe.com/reader/)/S/URI
- http://get.adobe.com/reader/)/Type/Annot/Rect[0
- http://www.JSON.org/json2.js
- http://www.JSON.org/js.html
- http://javascript.crockford.com/jsmin.html

Extracted artifacts 18

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`javascript_obj0067_000.js` `5300a78c6bdcf92c8041aa4ed3d775b4c158a06abd7b84337dea8912060228c8`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 67 at offset 0x2ABDC	57 bytes
`javascript_obj0067_001.js` `6bd26c858c57fa7dc6eeb0b6bf5e2230127abea8f98feae79f6bb2cd1700e400`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 67 at offset 0x2ABDC	68 bytes
`javascript_obj0067_002.js` `793ee6f7d9df425c88079c4cb22358b26afc00213b0a88fc6ffdb26abfefc123`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 67 at offset 0x2ABDC	69 bytes
`javascript_obj0070_003.js` `7acc69b13bf5d8c7b653738e96b9f9685263e2c2ec42d547f47deaadad03e458`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 70 at offset 0x2AF88	57 bytes
`javascript_obj0070_004.js` `dd42f18882d9938d2943019d23254da9257ae576df06f5d2764768b23a1f637c`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 70 at offset 0x2AF88	68 bytes
`javascript_obj0070_005.js` `3310797477d27ddfc8d20651fb51a63cb56d69c401da1fa9c0c9dec8e2a67d18`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 70 at offset 0x2AF88	69 bytes
`javascript_obj0070_006.js` `10c994da38f2f8f5f3c03663baac56dcdee544c490baa2bb869ecbdf49a1c9f1`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 70 at offset 0x2AF88	42 bytes
`javascript_obj0070_007.js` `9b5be65ad1e7ab91c02bc22d67ef9ff7d00e8d2e9d8d965b6f78ecfbf9cf07b6`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 70 at offset 0x2AF88	33 bytes
`javascript_obj0072_008.js` `bc0bf6c45904d1e3ec8c85e3cbaec0ae09863fa9e37d3436b0c91ca467e8cb1a`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 72 at offset 0x2B2FA	62 bytes
`javascript_obj0073_009.js` `d82ccb731e1237740e56c5b231c509bf0dc37a1042f598e5873e8cecd0971f99`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 73 at offset 0x2B478	67 bytes
`javascript_obj0074_010.js` `7be5756d5d630264076f33e98cfe1a3c599421bcb04a7201f7159a8044f512c0`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 74 at offset 0x2B5FE	67 bytes
`javascript_obj0075_011.js` `70258caac9631d1313d94f619d965f84d15e8e70ac295bcc796cea72d5b5c18b`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 75 at offset 0x2B780	69 bytes
`javascript_obj0076_012.js` `cf5f08f266fce57ab0b88295abfb16985a25cd50718a640c17dc567ae3d02086`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 76 at offset 0x2B906	75 bytes
`javascript_obj0076_013.js` `747a30df2710153c8e9212506e91333d7f221ab8b748ff3847fe0be58b88f6f6`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 76 at offset 0x2B906	76 bytes
`javascript_obj0080_015.js` `b4a05ce1a336f93d3dbf3c777d35fd2d9e07d98355e6f2be7368d95c8edfcdb4`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 80 at offset 0x2BDC9	47 bytes
`javascript_obj0012_016.js` `cf69b37ec38313bf96c586796d24cdb3eebd3959c4487ff752f33acbbdfb1993`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 12 at offset 0xB7E2	17351 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
`javascript_obj0014_017.js` `4053cb72eb75d9b7024f46556b66230442f3346e51895bc6728b6758623f8e05`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 14 at offset 0xCD86	152175 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 2 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
`javascript_obj0062_018.js` `0d385f6d75ee4ce6c535b67a8f1ca84517cfb225cf56b9908032d3956b2258cd`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 62 at offset 0x2A740	515 bytes

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