Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6a3b237de21690fd…

MALICIOUS

PDF

54.7 KB Created: 2020-09-01 20:42:11 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 2b920a0d88da1b8cfc677aaa59f44867 SHA-1: 1a1f20e3601049b267a49f9f87a4a3edc1a41381 SHA-256: 6a3b237de21690fdb1da9b72317fedaaa3a07bdee319fd41a55471f4acef643d
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains a critical heuristic indicating it links to known malicious redirector infrastructure, specifically `https://ttraff.cc/wix?keyword=command+prompt+format+drive+fat32`. Additionally, a heuristic for a 'Clipboard command execution lure' suggests the document instructs users to copy and paste content into a shell. This combination strongly implies an attempt to trick the user into executing malicious commands, likely to download and run a secondary payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/wix?keyword=command+prompt+format+drive+fat32
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/0564/8791/files/69068536958.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0439/0499/1400/files/classification_of_living_things_webquest_answer_key.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/7837/5831/files/celebrate_recovery_lesson_9.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/8029/5334/files/1899560536.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/kesutuzijakakewinepubad.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0440/4382/9398/files/wuduteduvopotutaxor.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/3428/0087/files/21693962409.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/4936/9252/files/lunisuwubed.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/7470/6853/files/air_force_utility_uniform_history.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_b97a0e3b72dc47ab8d3b8cce4610559d.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/87a178_4b72a9a2d1c746fca1877ca8a6068fcd.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/04e6f9_59cad72568dd40d2adf76aa1ff4bef62.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/d94ae5_bcbd1319a8504d17951f7a4c002bc10e.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/353d00_5f52130a53e246cb8858a93f4e2f9b7e.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/3e9e83_319d684f3f494420bf09d15aa485409b.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/90c678_52e60b1ca1bb48a48e90c7609d982941.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/3aee12_7e8c8b87a66f458ca61e6f8e68706241.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/7d21c0_f457f170111e4b7c8a38a72ebc2a54a2.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000089cf.bin
7f4f60fdcdc049765f324541820a4291ac2dc9ed7f410cf2e994a99ca58bff44		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x89CF 5144 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00009b41.bin
8d1ae38422a546dbd320863c7c9bb7a66d7ed27ded3e88b61f4f22440d114f47		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9B41 10468 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000bf0f.bin
1062cd8ddf90f4344fa193b395386d5669df1a952e5759311ca261a71931f361		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xBF0F 4324 bytes

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