RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 6a30d9ec6e0e15a9

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

484.1 KB

MD5: 7ece53e30caf70c35622a44d83717eae SHA-1: f0d5893f3a391c583401609a51fb4691f2fa6c32 SHA-256: 6a30d9ec6e0e15a9cdaf8d14c16ac2066b65a9a6f53c0f0816cb7713404363c5

182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object related to Equation Editor, specifically triggering CVE-2017-11882. This exploit is designed to execute arbitrary code, likely a second-stage payload, when the document is opened. The presence of the ".bin" file and high entropy further suggests a packed or obfuscated executable payload.

Heuristics 5

Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED

RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off0000005a.bin` `a09d0d9e82f2f9d26971ddef5364f834a26dc8bf94f86e86b96b5dae7c62951c`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x5A	247752 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.

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