Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6a2813955a0378b1…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

194.7 KB Created: 2019-11-01 07:42:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 12.0000
MD5: 38d8166331a79b31eb0a7e1460abe88b SHA-1: a92948a858651e443fa7655c426d13bffbfd8736 SHA-256: 6a2813955a0378b1c5cdd2392d87149c8e3b2efd08d50b35840cbda94c60d494
282 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a VBA macro with a Document_Open auto-execution subroutine. This subroutine calls the Shell() function, indicating an intent to execute an external command or program. This is a common technique for downloading and executing secondary payloads. ClamAV detection as 'Doc.Downloader.Generic' further supports this assessment.

Heuristics 7

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Generic-8011192-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Generic-8011192-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
1b48ec6fb2d9004cc6c18f5d1e154a9effa9d7d4f55d262cfa83cf7462cb24ef		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 51537 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
51018d1c9abc2de217ee3d625e20ca5c28197297bc02fef38b22b3739f7a8ad2		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 163840 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Generic-8011192-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely

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