Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6a1a2fd984c9212b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

50.4 KB Created: 2020-07-31 10:29:39 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: fab784e9dc073a8714e024cab23b1543 SHA-1: 7dc6fc12200a29bf4e449b9f12d751252ebea818 SHA-256: 6a1a2fd984c9212b1db1e3876e25d0144879118e25e128286be467cfac585887
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous embedded links, with one identified as a malicious redirector pointing to 'ttraff.com'. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, suggests a lure related to 'Linux interview questions pdf'. The presence of a password archive lure heuristic indicates a common tactic to bypass security scanners by encrypting the actual payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=linux+interview+questions+pdf
    • http://files.armstrongfamilylaw.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738534/451b5.pdf
    • http://files.spikeofalltrades.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813373/vexiwebolu.pdf
    • http://files.elainehunter.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131409090/rugiveki-wuwonuxomiru.pdf
    • http://files.okcstairclimb.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383456/voloxegepo.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/9166/5830/files/39443087681.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/5320/3104/files/wafabuvopevifajuw.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/7361/0663/files/gaxagewiror.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/29480145432.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/6975/7850/files/nujer.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0440/6896/2469/files/nakibu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/6725/2641/files/dawasurafutetu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/7365/9292/files/wujetivanemadixefunusu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/5032/0543/files/xizamujixoxefukadega.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/1339/7924/files/34136268797.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/1239/0038/files/sinuguregojumamiketomi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/2022/2627/files/zapevewez.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00008741.bin
7f9c0077d31917f0a35c4017fa92966009d1b84ebab9a4468abf09c9166a6cc2
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8741 4964 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00009848.bin
5a777abdb9053f2563a5730537c8efc168b1f682408e3db67e2717907e04339b
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9848 10528 bytes