Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6a0049fcd468b935…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.4 KB Created: 2020-08-05 15:08:46 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: dee98e6570055e0324689de6b51dcea6 SHA-1: b6e98234ca919fbd11a76dd528ff05515a4fdb1a SHA-256: 6a0049fcd468b9356ef5b8756d3fe018c8e2ca96e4d9277e9a6ee93684bffb72
154 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document contains numerous links, including one pointing to a known malicious redirector infrastructure at `https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=autocad+pdf+underlay+explode`. The document body, though obfuscated, also contains this URL, suggesting a lure to external malicious content. The presence of a large number of external PDF links, many hosted on Shopify, indicates a potential link farm or SEO manipulation tactic to distribute malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=autocad+pdf+underlay+explode
    • http://files.worem.org/uploads/1/3/2/6/132682040/f514390f657bc.pdf
    • http://files.kevorkian-architect.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857305/vobupotabuzu.pdf
    • http://files.aguayoperformance.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739032/8580419.pdf
    • http://files.gracereformed.co.za/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814402/6777781.pdf
    • http://milazigep.busyseasonstaffing.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775195/3267140.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/5811/0363/files/48430369915.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/9688/1814/files/makuwog.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/1447/0302/files/26778553338.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/6305/0394/files/runowadodajuxe.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/vasopamomakazemujavinis.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/9202/6271/files/big_java.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/7315/8806/files/kavisuru.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/2476/9436/files/66458034053.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/xoperesotojazi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/9050/9973/files/kukemowipapegolajidesabij.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0440/8400/2981/files/68682636993.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/3258/4098/files/38877849044.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006f99.bin
a152e02dbc7e430097cc2d62502b413c3e4753bcaca0393b032847e00e000dea
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6F99 5128 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00008131.bin
742e3292d155f89a9dac45c3c47c7e32d5b894125c2ec1db9d573c3ab570af7f
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8131 10372 bytes