Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 69f229827ee97794…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

44.7 KB First seen: 2023-02-15
MD5: a3ba90eb16ce762fa52cd87e4e877902 SHA-1: 866f0fb441964b677dab6d12b7db6dd5889350c2 SHA-256: 69f229827ee97794d03cefc35187d7e3faff1e467ce1db06fd2ab4b589479314
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically identified as an Equation Editor exploit. The presence of \objupdate indicates an attempt to automatically activate this object upon opening, bypassing user interaction. The document body contains a lure to 'Enable editing', which is a common tactic to trick users into allowing the exploit to run.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000051f9.bin
df8a39cc09feec1187d33292ca6369caae72ecbc5cb14d3181fb5c6d9d065277
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x51F9 2053 bytes