Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 69f043d892b28855…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.7 KB
MD5: f82763e5f524f19d47086b0eb3cb125f SHA-1: 710d1feeae85571ae3c9aaffdde73718fa13725b SHA-256: 69f043d892b288557c8053a4a70f517adff05da255843f2b047bc019df6daa99
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data and triggers heuristics related to Equation Editor exploitation, specifically CVE-2017-11882. This indicates the file is designed to exploit a vulnerability in the Equation Editor component to achieve arbitrary code execution upon opening. The presence of ".objupdate" further suggests an attempt to force OLE object activation.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000b5.bin
ffbfe86463aca9914396236ab9d463ef473826307b07ac9957d6d4479ace839e		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB5 2218 bytes

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