RTF malware analysis — malicious · 69e7fcfe5381c13b

MALICIOUS

RTF

29.2 KB First seen: 2020-09-07

MD5: 970b726ac52ee392616b7ead9d1afde9 SHA-1: 3cbf4870c6cbdbcb821f4e13ee53e7b6f1a6c004 SHA-256: 69e7fcfe5381c13bf9c7a2cd8b71758001e5170559902adc33f9084115c57eb4

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object that leverages a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component. The presence of \objupdate suggests that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically, leading to the execution of malicious code. This is a common technique for delivering secondary payloads, hence the high confidence in exploitation for client execution.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000017dc.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x17DC	1805 bytes
SHA-256: `42852ebb8e56218b5fa101a5d336160b9bed1082c10b3f81c67615f157a16feb`

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