Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 69c6e8d07d90d288…

MALICIOUS

PDF

143.2 KB Created: 2010-04-20 17:10:54 -04:00 Authoring application: 350
MD5: 0df553a489d5ac6a1756c66c5dc67b21 SHA-1: f8b8092e2dcd1a3420c5bfb73b19faf0eb9507a7 SHA-256: 69c6e8d07d90d288e12f42c12baf2f7e079200e2aca817429fd7e1b09b05d3e4
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains a critical heuristic indicating exploitation of CVE-2010-0188, a known vulnerability in Adobe Reader related to XFA forms and LibTIFF. This exploit is designed to achieve client-side execution, likely to download and run a secondary payload. The presence of an embedded file and a secondary embedded PDF further supports this malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9844

Heuristics 11

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains XFA image data with an inline crafted TIFF payload and shellcode/delivery markers. This is the data-bound variant of the CVE-2010-0188 Adobe Reader LibTIFF/XFA exploit shape.
  • CCITTFaxDecode + TIFF/XFA exploit prep — LibTIFF CVE-family indicator high CVE related PDF_CCITT_CVE_2010_0188_RELATED
    PDF uses /CCITTFaxDecode together with TIFF/XFA exploit-preparation markers such as rawValue image-field assignment, TIFF data, or heap-spray JavaScript. This matches the delivery pattern for Adobe Reader LibTIFF/CCITTFax parser exploit families, including CVE-2010-0188, but does not prove the exact malformed TIFF primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON
    PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 1 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • PDF differential parser failed info PDF_DIFFERENTIAL_PARSE_FAILED
    The cross-check parser (pdfminer.six) failed on this file: PDF differential parser failed: PSSyntaxError. Static heuristics still ran and any of their findings above are valid; only the differential cross-check signal is missing.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/1.0/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.4/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xtd/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-form/2.8/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0001.bin
5a479ff2881cc991bf2f5e5dffd9080c2332683563d973d5bbbbddf0f58331ed		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 1 at offset 0x51 13430 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
polyglot_child_pdf_off00018c3f.pdf
3f5f350f8d9416c1961b197609c961826cfae441d9d6fcc65d04c587d94e37d5		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x18C3F 45248 bytes

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