Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 69c4a5ce5cb8fbd4…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

127.8 KB Created: 2020-01-31 20:02:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: a4cce88f1b0368ad65f9e59ed959754c SHA-1: e0c9a40d1e9725b1e176e4811f5c3f2c0cbe147e SHA-256: 69c4a5ce5cb8fbd491fc5457c9e039502bf7138e4cfb3b75f92e19875f8ea227
264 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a VBA macro that executes upon opening the document, leveraging the Document_Open and GetObject heuristics. The obfuscated VBA code within the 'macros.bas' script likely attempts to download and execute a second-stage payload, as indicated by the concatenation of strings to form a URL. This behavior is characteristic of macro-based malware delivery.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Sagent-7572364-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Sagent-7572364-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
cd715d9390ee2519a89561c900dcfed4e634ad1a99bf75bcb28c7c5194254768		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 8670 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
8e94925f2296a998167df60b5eeef6e1cfacaa8fb236bf1c6d27bf5527534dd5		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 55296 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Sagent-7572364-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 long base64-like blob(s).

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