Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 696826a58ae7392e…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.5 KB
MD5: 4fd6f5aeed7440cc5dee7a0713929a3a SHA-1: 0838db41c78f9dd14b269e429a2a7876ef4d1db7 SHA-256: 696826a58ae7392ebe91d3fd4f0c5699afc687e2096613e21ae0bee96f229ff3
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of ".objupdate" indicates that the embedded OLE object is designed to be activated automatically, leading to the execution of arbitrary code. This is a common technique for exploiting client-side vulnerabilities via malicious documents.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000009b.bin
d620f983461442be3f12025561c4eefc30d51d5554e57b9899d1e01ae87b4941
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x9B 2056 bytes