Win.Packed.Hancitor-9909883-0 — Office (OLE) / .DOC malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 696417ed1765a362…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

1.16 MB Created: 2021-06-16 08:34:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: ac83eeb462fd77913555217e9ad2bb4f SHA-1: 05f1f730b3e7dca691bb35e3d3b9b87cbaec4db8 SHA-256: 696417ed1765a36267ad83d28bf8038d8e56615485db555edd09fe5e84d59547
642 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Win.Packed.Hancitor-9909883-0 · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a Document_Open VBA macro. This macro attempts to copy itself and then execute a DLL named 'omsh.dll' using 'rundll32.exe'. The macro also attempts to place the DLL in the user's template directory. The embedded PE executable and ClamAV detection further confirm its malicious nature, likely belonging to the Hancitor family.

Heuristics 17

  • Office EPRINT stream contains EMF object high CVE related OLE_EPRINT_EMF_OBJECT
    OLE ObjectPool contains an EPRINT stream with EMF data. This is rare in normal documents and is CVE-2007-3893/MS07-046-family evidence when paired with Office exploit payload anomalies, but the malformed EMF record is not proven by this rule alone.
  • OLE with Ole10Native — possible CVE-2026-21514 exploitation high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Document contains a Word OLE object with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. CVE-2026-21514 exploits OLE metadata validation; this stronger structure is treated as likely exploitation.
  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • ClamAV: Win.Packed.Hancitor-9909883-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Packed.Hancitor-9909883-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Reference to ShellExecute API high SC_STR_SHELLEXEC
    Reference to ShellExecute API
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API
  • Reference to VirtualProtect API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALPROTECT
    Reference to VirtualProtect API
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
32d4782c1de3ef1d5ccba8fb22777ead1c5a8d3e66f743e83e296bf991dbbc7c
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2064 bytes
embedded_office_0008f46e.exe
96933df0b9f357488431054857c5902a8ad6511bce40a798d5ca9f4789389d70
embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0x8F46E 625554 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Packed.Hancitor-9909883-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
ole10native_00.bin
8ca247552838f53117a13ee70847d8c201acf5446cc7f52ad5360277f2f36002
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1685312757/Ole10Native 592172 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Packed.Hancitor-9909883-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely