Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6946a2a14523eff3…

MALICIOUS

PDF

51.9 KB Created: 2020-11-07 23:32:04 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-01-23
MD5: 2516db85d2164223ed599d36e3ee3952 SHA-1: 794f9e87393db472a764c9552353db8e8e734f07 SHA-256: 6946a2a14523eff3b58fceb60b00bb92e8307696f64c2253078825a88019f8da
206 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 7

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Remote-support tool lure high SE_REMOTE_SUPPORT_LURE
    Document instructs the user to install, open, or connect with a remote-support tool such as AnyDesk, TeamViewer, Quick Assist, or ScreenConnect — high-risk in an unsolicited document
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffset.ru/aws?keyword=acer+chromebook+change+password PDF link annotation
    • https://wefamojugibe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164519/lebeki-maxifedof-rodil.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nanorobudilason.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775181/3ae9a2fcd2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mabanopovofed.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453130/333677.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mesipaku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383407/2672066.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gimejexoxixaza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131872185/roriturosiw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://megogira.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134590171/1df335c969ad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zenovoruzunej.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134339910/5732704.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://gezovuxa.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/5950436523.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kebupud.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/16674380217.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/falevi/52906900676.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/sabegokek/84141852215.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://likuzow.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/40264502684.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gukoxawe.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/menimugutitowegis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tibazimujo468501389.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/joxem.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wazewezobe.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/21274789839.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sixenuw.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/82538909599.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007e76.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7E76 5400 bytes
SHA-256: 1a92ede2fe856d9807be1edeef01c6902393a0f66ed032d44bbfaaf974b0cdc5
font_01_sfnt_off000090a0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x90A0 10536 bytes
SHA-256: a2d2719e7243811acc01a2fbab9833d6e2e085fd798d8aa7839dd8e5710003b0
font_02_sfnt_off0000b492.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB492 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 1158d95dac44631f497756703988ba3645251422e7ff0015d3fca430225e7c3e

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