Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 693ddb462812ccdb…

MALICIOUS

PDF

73.9 KB Created: 2021-01-08 02:12:18 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-27
MD5: 463859bef5313f06ce570237c7d88881 SHA-1: b5f6e847f8727a1a63d2abc96781605cb037f6e5 SHA-256: 693ddb462812ccdb2535102374cf256d41e4b5f3246489e431480d2ee8927580
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many pointing to disposable hosting services, indicating a link farm or SEO manipulation tactic. One critical heuristic identified links to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely to lure users to malicious sites or distribute further payloads.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffmen.ru/123?utm_term=vector+of+vectors+c%252B%252B+stl In PDF document text
    • https://nazuvunu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134438845/4673427.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dokakida.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380589/3b7480c9b0436f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4389108/normal_5f95307f243de.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4384650/normal_5f923f1ca003e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zutuvolesem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775525/xoxewubi_wadunirepebi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://juxilejaguzu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134404551/2468704.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zepixufiguw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/1/134108583/be47f6d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wejorawifaloju.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134458418/bowegeloruxelesinep.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gokopawe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134493337/97878.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4422897/normal_5f9e2e18e96ce.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dokodajibebabek.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132302773/51cf09cde3eb3b4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4468827/normal_5fd3b3dc7e0f8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c6ac6281-9376-43fb-9a7c-6507c57e4065/7186224408.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e3be.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE3BE 4692 bytes
SHA-256: a0e406bab9a78b0747f975cc3b8d353002415b2cdb94e4ec6c916899d11d05b7
font_01_sfnt_off0000f3d3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF3D3 11652 bytes
SHA-256: 3ce88b495e2d893c222a45244a137cd921a91281b541b19465aa78dfe1a1029b

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