Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 69335f76f3efa00d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

85.3 KB Created: 2010-04-12 17:33:05 +08:00 Authoring application: Avision Button Manager 1.1.3.7 (via Adobe PDF Scan Library 2.2)
MD5: 21a1cbdf22f1de459b1a0c19a4caa024 SHA-1: 809fced370f0b5736076460cb4ffa52e9003af6a SHA-256: 69335f76f3efa00d5d2668f02b4daf0195cafd5ee3c0a909538d9185b4013df1
352 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains JavaScript that leverages the CVE-2009-4324 vulnerability, specifically targeting the media.newPlayer API. This exploit is designed to execute arbitrary code, likely to download and run a second-stage malicious payload. The presence of multiple PDF-specific exploit heuristics and a high ML classifier score further support this assessment.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9985

Heuristics 12

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • JBIG2 + active content high CVE related PDF_JBIG2_ACTIVE_CONTENT
    JBIG2Decode appears with JavaScript/XFA/RichMedia — a related indicator for JBIG2 parser-exploit families including CVE-2021-30860 and CVE-2009-0658, but not a unique CVE fingerprint.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • unescape() call high PDF_UNESCAPE
    unescape() found — often used to decode shellcode in PDF JS exploits (matched inside decoded stream)
  • JBIG2Decode filter medium PDF_JBIG2
    JBIG2 image decoder present — historically used in zero-click exploits
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 1 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
stream_004_off0000063a.js
447cccb0b28690cfd35e6c7d285b83d1ca96a54fd0f2a437498ab8c6a303cc5d		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x63A 2610 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long hex-escaped blob(s).
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js
42c3f4df375ff6f58ff655cc4f88b5cc28f0dd33b978390db3538684a6219b74		 deobfuscated-js string-concatenation normalized Acrobat API aliases at offset 0x63A 126 bytes
objstm_0023_00.bin
e8bfe65c34a535b0837ce7c541e45b42ab61e1ff13de05788daf7770f9a1ec0e		 pdf-objstm-decoded PDF /ObjStm 23 0 obj (inflated) 274 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00009fd3.pdf
fae63acca341af87c6147366c1343a4a75432745f895527eed691363bf89c965		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x9FD3 46432 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00013d46.pdf
0b1c923c8a0028794f3a3244dc498786746334f394e41678cc58ffbeb707d0a8		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x13D46 6125 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.