Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 69275397c8f8bdc2…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

208.1 KB Created: 2020-12-26 12:34:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: dc41aa50be50697423ef1d266b9b1050 SHA-1: 6c90e082b24ceddbc02176be64a2f914e813ab48 SHA-256: 69275397c8f8bdc2b2f24c960375d9301a472a70b5f48f3ef4d72e2958e05a87
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The file is a malicious OOXML document containing an embedded OLE object. This object is identified as a risky file package that drops an auto-executable payload, specifically a JAR file. The presence of this embedded object strongly suggests an attempt to execute a secondary payload upon opening the document.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
d43d9a7610958b30700a3f0370100a6ad63e70761315d4ab27557df77528a622		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 198144 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.97, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
f3713f60c2f5a72dc2ab2b3c22f22c33522f1d06f5f37c9acc7d944809122e14		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 193758 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
c7e83b29c845e99d7752b8a3e4b499278db54fecea80b78c969e6b97b9beac6c		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5148 bytes

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