Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Heuristics 10

• VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
  VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
• Dangerous API name reassembled from split string literals critical OLE_VBA_SPLIT_KEYWORD_OBFUSCATION
  VBA concatenates short string literals that reassemble a dangerous API/ProgID/LOLBin name (e.g. Scripting.FileSystemObject, WScript.Shell, powershell, URLDownloadToFile) which appears in no single literal. Splitting an API name across string concatenation is done only to evade keyword scanning.
• ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Sagent-9376492-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
  ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Sagent-9376492-0
• ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
  ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
• Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
  Document_Open macro
• GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
  GetObject call
• VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
  Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
• VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
  Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
• Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
  Document contains an embedded OLE object
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas

  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

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