RTF malware analysis — malicious · 69048d5ebc825f6e

MALICIOUS

RTF

84.4 KB First seen: 2024-08-14

MD5: 535629891a7702edeba1aff340bd682b SHA-1: 11e1c0e5fa9407844dcdea9419d9ff8e1746766e SHA-256: 69048d5ebc825f6eabbd312855e5b9c3dcae7f7415a984981886f965f1385756

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the OLE object is designed to be activated automatically, leading to code execution. The decoded OLE object, objdata_00_off000012b2.bin, is the likely component that carries out the exploit. The attack pattern suggests a downloader or dropper mechanism, aiming to fetch and execute further malicious content.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000012b2.bin` `b15a4cae9e3a3393361de93792fad4550d4f9531ad0776c2bda89d30848ec473`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x12B2	1761 bytes

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