IcedID — Office (OOXML) / .DOC malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 68f34245615927ce…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

34.0 KB Created: 2021-11-09 09:44:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: b69c97b460592132c618b75e2db6e75c SHA-1: 2263b4272e5cc9de9ffcd6e02e572e7340523dfe SHA-256: 68f34245615927ce58fa909f90b75c6db663f8b13a0e3247edd96b9884f8e4f0
322 Risk Score

Malware Insights

IcedID · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a VBA macro with a Document_Open auto-execution function. This macro utilizes WScript.Shell to execute a command that appears to download and run a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Downloader.IcedID' strongly suggests the IcedID family, which is known for its downloader capabilities.

Heuristics 8

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.IcedID-8ff0f02ff0876072-9950256-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.IcedID-8ff0f02ff0876072-9950256-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
c6a4aa3038ece682172e695abd57c779bd8d67725e14be45c6388bd0cf14923f		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1003 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
f494d47b4c5c53bd76184cded662e790556f6518538d4a1dd22722a1ce9d9ca2		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 15360 bytes

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