Office (OLE) / .XLS malware analysis — malicious · 68e68f4e37001e6c

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

313.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-07-27

MD5: 2045a5a5cf80314f6fc156e797762190 SHA-1: 640d72f83acdc375a691035c2b3bcfdba82ebee3 SHA-256: 68e68f4e37001e6c2e926824b10edf72d751dfb6a51d3986afb9c7cfb5d68bcf

106 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.001 Malicious Link: User Execution

The sample is an OLE2Link object that leverages CVE-2017-0199 to download a secondary payload from the embedded URL. The embedded PDF content, while containing image lures, does not provide further direct clues about the payload's function. The primary threat is the remote code execution facilitated by the OLE object.

Heuristics 5

OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199

Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE

A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE

PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL

The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://192.3.243.146/DTC/ID/IDTCIDTCIDTCIDTCIDTCDITDCIDTCIDTCIDTCI%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23IDTCIDTCIDTCIDTCIDRCIEIDTCIDTCIDTCI.DOC

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`polyglot_child_pdf_off00000e00.pdf` `49d085f4db7549f91882bac2dc9e82a91c906f6cf2ed026b7c5950f073861891`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE00	316928 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off00005e00.pdf` `cf1c50c57dd125599b1a96f105bce5b3a1ec0506acdcc2824bc06854fd11a026`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x5E00	296448 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off00009200.pdf` `31ef7a87b62af8a257d82a2815ff0466fbd44e98c95d9c7c696bc59244091888`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x9200	283136 bytes

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