Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 68d9150e3fdcc8b5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

41.5 KB Created: 2020-07-10 07:18:44 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-09-24
MD5: 85a0ee2c3766e4a9e5fc6fb7f0cdc0a0 SHA-1: 6b2c15e498463964701272346e4dfd3863ce46ee SHA-256: 68d9150e3fdcc8b5e22ff16b88e836732f66a1d2342346ad3e7382cba8714df1
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded URLs, many of which point to disposable domains and are likely part of a link farm designed to manipulate search engine results. One critical heuristic identified a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains a URL that appears to be the primary lure. No scripts were extracted from this sample, but the overall structure suggests a malicious SEO-based distribution campaign.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/wb?keyword=pearson%20ib%20history%20cold%20war%20pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.icdriversedge.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398164/1720343.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.lennoxwellness.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131378921/salarod.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.bmorewell.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406433/kakodutoxomazujalen.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.tidygardensfencing.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130774990/1813824.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.evaatkinson.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874541/totovala.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.libercloud.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132303023/vifavokuji_ruxebanijo_satalosadixonuf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.soheilaazadi.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969498/bumit.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://fovuweba408505925.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/kixezeganozekerejofevolig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://topinideteba.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/ritafezezilana.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://poxabageg.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/loduworazagofabo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dimexemivega.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/39368471195.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/kexikebesadunav.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/32600433864.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/tefukina.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000634a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x634A 5368 bytes
SHA-256: 280d1bbf5c0d058e1b312e10deeff6d49416fa76005eb1e42203e343b00bd4e4
font_01_sfnt_off00007588.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7588 10548 bytes
SHA-256: 084b956a29b202f07dc6f27430c189030f1683711d2ebb58611e4b762d571f14