Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 68c3a81d423e37d4…

MALICIOUS

PDF

652.9 KB Created: 2013-04-05 01:26:49 Authoring application: ImageMagick 6.8.2-3 2013-01-30 Q16 http://www.imagemagick.org
MD5: 342bf6a95fb31c6de6612ac87e153a30 SHA-1: bd8b12cb691bda3a5e0f74c82bd2ee637410dbee SHA-256: 68c3a81d423e37d451e5c3116c9f1ebc9fcbb36e048ef51f364610929aab763c
458 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that triggers a launch action for cmd.exe, which in turn attempts to export an embedded file named 'admit-card.pdf'. This embedded file is detected as a Windows executable payload. The combination of a launch action, embedded executable, and JavaScript dropper strongly indicates a malicious intent to execute a payload disguised as a document.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\admit-card.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 1 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.imagemagick.org

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
admit-card.pdf
8cf67cde38c2e7e020e8dc7e81953baaa042dff9e2699db0b684ff2b9b599cdf
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 21 at offset 0xA127D 15872 bytes
javascript_obj0022_000.js
adfe9cb5b243522a815057d0d739d3d713aae4c032bbad2c8dfac3060970979d
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 22 at offset 0xA2F45 59 bytes