Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 68a817608fe617b6…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

193.7 KB Created: 2022-09-21 07:30:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-09-23
MD5: ccccbef42562ecddb6cce00807898e35 SHA-1: 58fd5e0e655afeabf8dc55f0e11a35d810ecd8c4 SHA-256: 68a817608fe617b6da71fa248b48281cb3899c76d129eb390baa871141a773e1
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking: Ole10Native

The sample is an OOXML document containing an embedded OLE object. Heuristics indicate that this OLE object is a package that drops an auto-executable payload, specifically identified as a .jar file. The embedded artifacts confirm the presence of OLE objects and an EMF file, likely used to disguise or facilitate the execution of the payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
b0fcf47b5ecc249e0e8cafd089892fb156aadbbfdc1aaaf4e695f11d598a12a4		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 168960 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.96, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
c6b3a45f6123decd35a2280b104879c6873d77292e60a838a07738e85347d363		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 164447 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
f9a3b7b665540250b41cc577257361c3b9ccc6ea83a165c37d0aa3df976096bb		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5464 bytes

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