Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 68787c37bf93031f…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.2 KB
MD5: 384fe17729703e886f229535dda0cb57 SHA-1: 0d4b1b51a336049e3690972ceefdbefbc5bd6402 SHA-256: 68787c37bf93031f2a527cd80dafc96cc5890acdf356bed5a1255db40f18b9a2
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. This indicates an attempt to exploit a client execution vulnerability, likely delivered as a spearphishing attachment. No further IOCs were extracted from the document body or embedded objects.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000009b.bin
4d8e09ab53f1168caba0dd8da5d68a3900a22476c11b54d9a9cab0a5e34ef7fe
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x9B 1423 bytes