Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6849de17a031d044…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

300.9 KB Created: 2022-09-15 07:25:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-09-15
MD5: 3ad46d168594968b309f93bee7efe50c SHA-1: cda75f0b2dfe8e6543c506d48bc077c98c5a47f9 SHA-256: 6849de17a031d0443d8ea45da241796343dd9f80bd22d86dcf004b10fc7338f0
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking: DLL Side-Loading

The file is a malicious OOXML document containing an embedded OLE object. This object is identified as an Ole10Native package that drops an auto-executable payload, specifically noting the presence of a JAR extension. The embedded OLE object and the nature of the dropped payload suggest an attempt to execute secondary malicious code.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
4c1ccb209c00c3f606636a67d7fbbb4ec75aca922f8420dc37b7c4c989a86073		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 190464 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.97, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
67b4a18e09e4692a584ff9d1c3ad1d514270f20cc31826cdf984b5def1da1e66		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 186100 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
56727bf708f59915ec9758e6067d1464e553ed7c7534bb68e05989010c027e68		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5464 bytes

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