Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 68436ca29b1e1e1b…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

35.8 KB First seen: 2023-05-17
MD5: 9e1bcc4aa797629a8294b9fa6c680fd0 SHA-1: ace8d6fd078f2f4967c24dd0fe70851f724568aa SHA-256: 68436ca29b1e1e1b810914a430cf1671c3225112a5320fbfe05f75d6a8441521
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, and the document body includes a lure to 'Enable editing', suggesting a malicious intent to execute arbitrary code upon user interaction. No scripts were extracted from this sample.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000044f9.bin
a807000690438c96396008327842aa549986480eb9f72a02dcece9860e73e376
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x44F9 1707 bytes