Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 681608dd15f794c1…

MALICIOUS

PDF

83.2 KB Created: 2021-03-09 21:50:15 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-06-17
MD5: 08030044ee9502c51c34db4c2021465a SHA-1: 34fbc811bc1264d4fa0fc9d46c47d8317705b854 SHA-256: 681608dd15f794c1f7781fa415489e25e37d45143f50c9e9450dc600588c0af9
126 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous embedded URLs, many pointing to disposable domains, indicating a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious content. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely for phishing or malware delivery. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded links are consistent with techniques used to distribute malware or phish for credentials.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://druttle.ru/wb?keyword=mcat%20practice%20test%20reddit PDF link annotation
    • http://milanbeach.fun/debirogajikivitibavanewdswyq.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://digitaloffice24.ru/gubuvovelawetajilij8qyn.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://golden-charm.ru/90270932465corfj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mexicotop.xyz/bufikixetajerujelujrc5d5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4476595/normal_6046a40e5c9f7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://itclick.info/dafudim9vii0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4413719/normal_6017449ca91ea.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4460694/normal_5fed451a910e9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4416786/normal_60452d4200fe6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://alkostore.xyz/justificacion_teorica_de_un_proyecto_de_investigacion_ejemployx0zx.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://health-top.ru/hoover_carpet_cleaner_solution_targetbece9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/dumupa/transformers_sentinel_prime_titans_return.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/bulujono/cutting_edge_advanced_answer_key.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/aaaea244-8ed9-4fd7-9bce-66f251ab5fcb/38718699476.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f1bc3d63-ade1-429e-a060-7100fbb9c8e0/wubiruvugexunuguti.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/pisedij/xuxunipebekomotarinufik.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/4d87dada-356c-4754-8904-e4839f1a6f9f/music_publishing_company_business_plan.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.kaptest.com/mcathttps://www.princetonreview.com/meIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00010571.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10571 5040 bytes
SHA-256: fed38ee0de2d9d7c10fbb38959dcab4fa13dbfbe74a1e9909c49e1e9b50049d0
font_01_sfnt_off000116ab.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x116AB 12104 bytes
SHA-256: d08df6a061331452326eed1a4a4362f695db3c7cb91c03c3017eb0bb37121c8e

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