Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 67eb452e61934977…

MALICIOUS

PDF

43.0 KB Created: 2020-08-29 21:48:56 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 254ae71d1e21fdadaec18941a654dd84 SHA-1: a85c1fdf1b486a9b3b3ac7f94ca86f2b5189ca4b SHA-256: 67eb452e61934977b9d0ca15008a88a9f59741f2f64c2e373d437b0ed57f324c
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains a lure to copy and paste content into a command-line context, indicated by the 'SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE' heuristic. It also redirects to a known malicious URL, 'https://ttraff.ru/wix?keyword=learn+command+line+the+hard+way', and hosts a large number of other PDF links, suggesting a link farm or redirection scheme. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wix?keyword=learn+command+line+the+hard+way
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/6830/1212/files/salegebex.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0461/8505/4361/files/cox_tv_remote_setup_codes.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0441/4128/1432/files/guest_speaker_introduction_template.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0212/5733/files/vetugileterupitofuxa.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/xibirinadinabamagumib.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/4052/9816/files/neripuvaxefagagilijiwalo.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/5556/2402/files/98489239132.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/1822/1730/files/dalereviwefakevomuf.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/5331/8298/files/anatomy_of_flowering_plants_neet_questions.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/8621/7383/files/razupakenal.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/5173/5448/files/rutani.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/1230/9670/files/porob.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/8918/3398/files/paxaniweselamo.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/ce14f3_abaaf92dad084aedaa7767e2cc2e4d48.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/4dd980_91e57946b8dd45aaa17866a38ed81edf.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000060a8.bin
dde241441c525644b132e36281726fb9fce7a40e802e359bf1774644d126a031		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x60A8 5136 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000071fe.bin
dbc08266841f6ccdb7688571046e85ef4478975075dcaca16abb82ce2fe33a12		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x71FE 14228 bytes

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