Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 679b1aa139d03c63…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

22.4 KB First seen: 2022-12-29
MD5: 04907213843284a3d598ccfe964bd56b SHA-1: 619c27f4d7f1966fb680be2801928e8b157a8700 SHA-256: 679b1aa139d03c63958660de63d119d6019bab23c0a902039e80051df235b461
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating a likely exploit attempt targeting CVE-2017-11882. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, and the document body includes a lure to 'Enable editing', suggesting a malicious macro or exploit is intended to run upon user interaction. No scripts were extracted, and the specific family is not identifiable from the available evidence.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000041f6.bin
58b09a0c3cbf316fb4c39ec4d52a87ad059e22b3bf6da6c735311ac111b9954e
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x41F6 1509 bytes