Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6789ba6303da03e7…

MALICIOUS

PDF

76.1 KB Created: 2021-03-17 14:13:22 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: d6a416e11d724cdeb56c5a3ea6875e12 SHA-1: 2fe19b4307598935f203cd63086674a587aa3ad8 SHA-256: 6789ba6303da03e7ed3b56d3da7c88b3e512b07849ca6c1ce1423d76acd41672
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. It contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm or phishing operation. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains metadata suggesting it was generated by wkhtmltopdf, and the presence of embedded URLs points towards an attempt to redirect users to malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9996

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://jumiwimov.ru/123?utm_term=academic+journal+guide+abs
    • https://lafowujokunoro.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738997/kimisebepep-nuwasopozewab-fepabujo.pdf
    • https://tuwopabawebude.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131382790/gufebax.pdf
    • http://didopikorubozav.iblogger.org/dorejuwifelizikuxokoraki.pdf
    • http://gemofesane.medianewsonline.com/how_to_use_singer_profinish_serger.pdf
    • https://kojemugolipoxo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134729864/5069880.pdf
    • https://bapuporodotuxo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381531/kulonevu-saxetazurufuk.pdf
    • https://pewarefat.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134361746/9d26d150b2b2787.pdf
    • https://pebepatesova.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134447190/8057033.pdf
    • https://xozejobe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406614/9d3192b.pdf
    • http://zitokujamu.mypressonline.com/what_type_of_trans_fluid_for_chevy.pdf
    • https://vulakesekek.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438428/vuxemodumadijaxoluf.pdf
    • https://nakefofomiruni.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134483242/tanemepajinadolusiza.pdf
    • https://wemibevufiwoseb.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813314/1242086.pdf
    • https://memezuwiz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134702577/4611780.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://43081b45-6e48-4b43-b724-9328fda377ae.filesusr.com/ugd/26481d_7e38479fd1c042e681c9cc4944282d7c.pdf?index=true
    • https://a97be2a3-bfb5-42de-bba9-b145341b31aa.filesusr.com/ugd/1f2860_2f70afce61ca47d6a394ecaaa4dfdd64.pdf?index=true
    • http://pejebitopaw.rf.gd/windows_server_2012_r2_free_download_full_version_with_key.pdf
    • https://08c3cc13-1ce0-4add-927e-a3aed263473e.filesusr.com/ugd/ccf397_987b6b6e54b84c88bd0e081718565a70.pdf?index=true
    • https://b2d1eea7-aef5-47fc-962c-88b5513ecafc.filesusr.com/ugd/3a57bc_99fde721b0444d95af37fe1aee069d75.pdf?index=true
    • https://add83a7c-0e31-48b3-928b-061d82ba9144.filesusr.com/ugd/205ae4_cc29a54bbb1d4337859c25e642299053.pdf?index=true
    • http://janofegiwene.epizy.com/85760846156.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ea19.bin
96daa5178a4449de5b60dce8a233688a5b78c79d292138cbe8a5b57717c29847		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEA19 5464 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000fc98.bin
5869b8209e52d26bcafae1072138539be0a7fbe69b8505db6206e15d4ed1cffc		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFC98 10988 bytes

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