Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 673d1a359ff07aed…

MALICIOUS

RTF

261.2 KB Created: 2018-07-03 09:28:00 First seen: 2019-02-20
MD5: 6a40b78ba04625540e61851aeff75560 SHA-1: 6591f81c6de229b5643e74db26d135505dd1a3cc SHA-256: 673d1a359ff07aed3d9f33ccb5475ed91bfcad2b548607818ca654c622308056
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects and triggers critical heuristics for CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2017-8759, indicating exploitation for client execution. The embedded URL suggests a download of a second-stage payload, likely delivered via spearphishing.

Heuristics 7

  • CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882
    Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Exploit.Cve_2017_11882-7570663-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Exploit.Cve_2017_11882-7570663-1
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://alokparvprakashan.com/wp-includes/js/tinymce/themes/inlite/l/fay.msi In RTF body
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordmlIn RTF body

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000bf6b.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBF6B 15672 bytes
SHA-256: 31d55e2fde4e66db32efdcf3d5300c26ac2429a8ad571a554267a1daf181bb10

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