Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 67200543fc8f01b4…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

422.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-04-14
MD5: 37f0ce5c9c7a2efe5b158b343ac56023 SHA-1: 26dd29490a5c6324bc87d15935caf0e787a95968 SHA-256: 67200543fc8f01b45c223688a34e6b0119becd1aac90febe7928a5988fa0820a
110 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an OLE file that exploits CVE-2017-0199, a known vulnerability for remote code execution. The heuristic indicates it attempts to load a remote resource from the provided URL, which is likely a secondary payload. The embedded PDF also shows suspicious static findings, suggesting a multi-stage attack. No VBA macros were found to be executable, but the primary exploit vector is clear.

Heuristics 4

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ZZZZ99999999ZZZZZZ99999999ZZZZZZZ55555Z5Z5Z55Z5Z5Z5ZZZZZZZ0LLLLLLLOOOOO0000000000LLLLL00000000000OOOLLLLLLL@192.3.179.136/x.............x.doc

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
stream_001_off00000960.bin
2998a126f4fa11ceb265371a5f7968ec18bc4692a32631a544232dc74040021f
decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x960 252488 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00011800.pdf
5c9bb2390b1657196771299f62a3d8d497cd47d528791ccbd84ecbebc4d9b4fe
polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x11800 360960 bytes