Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 670d9f0b35181bf0…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

171.9 KB Created: 2020-07-27 09:07:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 8f62724131ae30b3f549834fc066a13a SHA-1: 962bfa7be67e019e2abeb65ad774be4bd8466752 SHA-256: 670d9f0b35181bf02a22246f4695c2bc2e4e056c636e3381916dc6fc35a2eaf8
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The 'Document_Open' macro is present and utilizes a hidden UserForm property to execute a command stager. This stager is designed to download and execute a secondary payload, as indicated by the obfuscated string concatenation within the script. The ClamAV detection also confirms its malicious nature.

Heuristics 7

  • VBA UserForm hidden-property command stager critical OLE_VBA_USERFORM_HIDDEN_COMMAND_STAGER
    VBA auto-exec macro creates a COM object from a decoded variable and reconstructs command text through Split/Join and hidden UserForm properties such as ControlTipText, Tag, Pages, or HelpContextId. This is a high-confidence macro downloader/loader shape seen in the reviewed OLE set, but it is not an Office CVE exploit primitive.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Logan-9219452-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Logan-9219452-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
c4a1b60f587f0cd10b55e32d571180aaadcb18ee2beb5cafcbdaa37ff5b93bd8
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 4056 bytes