Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 66f79b38490cf467…

MALICIOUS

PDF

38.3 KB Created: 2020-06-04 02:46:29 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 42d13188d7d96c6b3713f45b1e48d6c8 SHA-1: 8ed2511904e668a3bdc8880ece9c9ad6a7a3ef24 SHA-256: 66f79b38490cf46795efc26e4cbe828db96e97bb2fdb5a7d7ba8bbc943f1861d
176 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document exhibits characteristics of a dropper, as indicated by the 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic and the 'ML_NYX_PDF_MALICIOUS' flag. It contains a large number of external links, suggesting it may be part of a link farm or used to redirect users to malicious content. The presence of the ClamAV detection 'Pdf.Dropper.Agent-9254794-0' further supports its malicious nature. The document's primary function appears to be to trick the user into enabling content, likely to download and execute a secondary payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-9254794-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-9254794-0
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://74-123-78-37.mgwnet.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130604173/130604173.html#caderno+de+caligrafia+russa+pdf
    • http://kentuckypodiatry.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775458/sabowi.pdf
    • http://bluegrassbirthjourney.net/uploads/1/3/0/5/130551212/0999f.pdf
    • http://debtbedone.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131607022/nakizorirolewor.pdf
    • http://dmd-associates.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130540281/e29be8d9c7002be.pdf
    • http://thunderinglionskungfu.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130588548/8867965.pdf
    • http://cfsullivan.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775803/kurum_safeg.pdf
    • http://live-vibez.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130620430/97f23250.pdf
    • http://74-123-78-37.mgwnet.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130604173/terms.html
    • http://74-123-78-37.mgwnet.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130604173/dmca.html
    • http://74-123-78-37.mgwnet.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130604173/policy.html
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://bababepuvo.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/10105500228.pdf
    • https://vokosufike.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/dadose.pdf
    • https://kurupava.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/mugemakuzidupedanema.pdf
    • https://pidunatuji.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/tenapen.pdf
    • https://raxupevifaj316168670.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/riveximaw.pdf
    • https://pusamurivu.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/lojivemigalumupatedo.pdf
    • https://nolegibi.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/renegawivurad.pdf
    • https://zafuzox.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/dikemevolulu.pdf
    • https://rokokexer.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/gageten.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000645b.bin
b9324a77f58ec8ecd8ff6294d11d5dc0a07151ba872ac411c37c2ea8f13ff7a5		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x645B 12812 bytes

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