Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 66f3340bb69ca25f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

87.0 KB Created: 2021-09-15 22:57:42 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 3486cceba2944b1533f675e8968f25a9 SHA-1: 03d107265465539d681ad2b7c4b2c777417f3637 SHA-256: 66f3340bb69ca25ff3342079c795b9f49c01d18960ecfdf00a2a5632aed34a66
156 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains numerous embedded URLs, many of which point to compromised WordPress upload directories or disposable hosting, indicating a link farm designed to redirect users. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely phishing or malware delivery through these links.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9973

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://sarigol.kr/userData/ebizro_board/file/49633839086.pdf
    • https://barcelonacentromedico.es/files/galeria/files/kuxegawudor.pdf
    • http://conservationenergy.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16142345ea392a---damexu.pdf
    • http://eg-connect.com/php_codes/Scott/VieauAssociates/code/userfiles/file/kokepasafanejugase.pdf
    • http://andreagarciam.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613dd1637e738---35763759534.pdf
    • http://autoachtercamper.nl/userfiles/file/97412983717.pdf
    • http://architectureanddesign.it/userfiles/files/wizabidefa.pdf
    • https://heyratacademy.ir/file/rikunirerinetubivinosijaz.pdf
    • http://master-vin.ru/files/file/48844493852.pdf
    • http://osteriadelcampanile.com/userfiles/files/51545384047.pdf
    • http://munnarteabungalows.com/userfiles/file/87922581107.pdf
    • http://captainkillmite.com/uploads/files/202109141856382262.pdf
    • https://exam11.menapoint.com/app/webroot/upload/files/32133833247.pdf
    • https://m-astar.com/UserFiles/files/kenarobe.pdf
    • http://retroldn.com/userfiles/file/35356862608.pdf
    • http://ottotech.center/userfiles/file/pijinamuvufimisubusakezef.pdf
    • https://dalilak1.com/userfiles/file/65143065225.pdf
    • https://samavetpharm.com/userfiles/files/vawiwukikakimi.pdf
    • http://hkbroadwin.com/userfiles/kigabopazosozenido.pdf
    • https://happycustomerservice.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0a4cd557f181f65ef7e7e39277cd49e3/rizoza.pdf
    • http://craj-ops.craj.cz/soubory/40960053085.pdf
    • http://www.combatsim.eu/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16134c43b04ab1---98366137864.pdf
    • http://zamgph.com/FCKeditor/editor/filemanager/connectors/php/uploads/file/141344251096.pdf
    • http://rhondachem.com/d/files/80953462629.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/Om9ozkHLxGw/uplcv?utm_term=iphone+group+messages+not+sending+to+android
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ee31.bin
a497e5a3bc2aa43e3af22653fc89dedb00f90aa9321d56e629150c6d0141b8a4
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEE31 18056 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00011d36.bin
9f5aef6baa6968433adb1afb520e96aca297c90b8eef97277de62c9074cd7330
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11D36 10844 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000135df.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x135DF 16792 bytes