Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 66f16e8f88893a54…

MALICIOUS

PDF

35.3 KB Created: 2020-07-09 08:25:55 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-05-09
MD5: b223dc90f72389a43db2df109900e04c SHA-1: 6ef06f4d834fc69e547de05d862cb08cca6241be SHA-256: 66f16e8f88893a5453f15955354acb7e3d002a9d055cd5985847d6bf7197b750
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links pointing to external PDF files hosted on various domains. Several heuristics indicate this is a malicious redirector and a link farm, likely intended to manipulate search engine results or lead users to malicious content. The ML classifier also strongly flagged this PDF as malicious.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/wb?keyword=greater%20kashmir%20e%20paper%20pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.theinsurancecorners.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871651/loxaxapebugo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.farhillaussiedoodles.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131454670/98e3532721.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.sportseconomics.org/uploads/1/3/2/3/132302966/8686491.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.911bodyresq.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776118/natarudul-wasawebi-pifag-nisaneneduk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.pomfpanda.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969758/2005003.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.elitegymsamui.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695836/zeleredo_totaramabijipi_xaporusikije.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.euccommunity.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381839/jadum_futolono_dugelarujine.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.ejpendergraft.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813305/3002a8adcaf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.southlandfamilyclub.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379371/e862cb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://fivulenis.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/dutozamol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://visazuk.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/nijugalexedu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zunizavuj.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/gifoputobiretaveziloki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mowawosubi.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/95764742909.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/43778875991.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/99231100330.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/21659337375.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/dagezaluvonanapukinuwit.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/84312174386.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00004dad.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4DAD 4916 bytes
SHA-256: 3b79a4eb94ba1ae7589dd31a5be693f39df024a5cf111291014675444a86e325
font_01_sfnt_off00005e6b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5E6B 10356 bytes
SHA-256: 4197da21bf246cc1fc606a76e362f7629297d958de4c66f759e6f064d74ccd21

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