Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 66ea5bbcfd35f6a7…

MALICIOUS

PDF

45.0 KB Created: 2020-10-30 13:11:28 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-04
MD5: b2e36dcf67b4ee10dd93f31c4d75a35f SHA-1: 2f42d29194102ef81c26b3b7b7c23db9151551a5 SHA-256: 66ea5bbcfd35f6a7684f3394d0a63ed1474e0c421fcd9dcb4e340a717f95dc0b
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document was flagged as malicious by an ML classifier. The file embeds a large number of external links characteristic of an SEO link farm and routes users through malicious redirector infrastructure. Specific URLs and indicators for this sample are listed in the indicators section.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.club/123?keyword=vocal+parts+word+whizzle+answers In PDF document text
    • https://damijuvik.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381376/voredovan_waliwineviwego_monukisarifoso_bomilisu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vodiwisilob.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681054/63888c9a1958b01.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://banafazag.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134325205/xexopojizitobil.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://putigazabikikim.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132682718/3526753.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://polabufasol.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132814050/rajesupupigekik.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lozulijulejibog.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857057/70ab1fefa9e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://setekonireza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/1/134131298/guvazututaximolal.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xonimitofowe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132682232/patevenebepil_fugape_rojoxirukali_gabixosogagi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://genamimiwovem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131636881/supivaxapoboreranom.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lotagixowila.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164100/femof.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/6213/2897/files/kenikoramenekezoxu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0500/6812/7893/files/the_thirteenth_tale_novel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/7623/0046/files/colorado_state_fair_2019_concerts.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000070e4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x70E4 5268 bytes
SHA-256: f35ed5dff8e07787136ff1b5483f1257d95d08aabc152de432439e12745903a2
font_01_sfnt_off000082dd.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x82DD 10640 bytes
SHA-256: c3b4563f5de32cb43aae4290af573faec23446b3cbdb87cd52f83dad417ef384

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